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Introduction
In the area of corporation law, the United States legal academy periodically
falls in love with its own ideas. In the early 1990s, for example, scholars
wrote about, and subsequently oversold, institutional investor activism as a
means of holding corporate managers and boards of directors accountable.' In the 1980s, takeover bids and the market for corporate control
1. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 811 (1992); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control:
The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 CoLuM. L. REv. 1277 (1991); cf.

Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significanceof InstitutionalShareholderActivism, 79 GEo. Lj. 445 (1991) (explaining the only likely players will be a small subset of
a subset of institutional investors, namely, some but not all of the public employee pension funds in the pension fund sector); Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in
CorporateGovernance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. Rev. 795 (1993).
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occupied center stage.2
Scholars partaking in the corporate social responsibility movement of
the 1970s thought government intervention was necessary to keep managers and boards responsible, whether in the form of federal minimum legal
standards for corporate actors, 3 federal chartering of large publicly held
accounting and disclosure, 5 or
corporations, 4 mandatory corporate social
6
directors.
interest
public
of
installation
Today the academy has become much enamored with the notion of
"global" convergence in corporate governance. That is to say, in the opinion of a number of the elites in the United States corporate law academy,
the governance structure and practices of larger corporations all over the
world soon will take on a resemblance one to another. 7 The telecommunications revolution, the ease of international jet travel, and pressure from
law makers, stock exchanges, pension funds, and others, combine to motivate and enable those who control larger corporations to become conversant with corporate governance structures and practices. Those who
2. Leading pieces include Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper
Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1161
(1981); Ronald Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer
Defense, 35 STAN. L. REv. 51 (1982); see also Ronald J. Gilson, The Case Against Shark
Repellent Amendments: Structural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REv.
775 (1982). The insight that a market exists for corporate control was developed by
Dean Henry Manne. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Marketfor CorporateControl, 73
J.POL. EcoN. 110 (1965).
3. E.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and CorporateLaw: Reflections upon Delaware,
83 YALE LJ. 663, 700-01 (1974).
4. E.g., RALPH NADER ET AL.,

CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE CORPORATION:

THE CASE FOR

THE FEDERAL CHARTERING OF GIANT CORPORATIONS (1976); Donald E. Schwartz, Federal
Charteringof Corporations:An Introduction, 61 GEo. L.J. 71 (1972); Note, Federal Chartering of Corporations:A Proposal,61 GEO. LJ. 89 (1972).
5. E.g., Douglas M. Branson, Progress in the Art of Social Accounting and Other Arguments for Disclosureon CorporateSocial Responsibility, 29 VAND. L. REv. 539 (1976).
6. E.g., Herman Schwartz, GovernmentallyAppointed Directorsin a PrivateCorporation-The Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 79 HARv. L. REv. 350 (1965); Symposium, The CorporateMachineryfor Hearingand Heeding New Voices, 27 Bus. LAw. 195,
197-208 (1971).
7. E.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Commonalities and Prescriptionsin the Vertical
Dimension of Global CorporateGovernance, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1133, 1145-1146 (1999);
Brian R. Cheffins, CurrentTrends in Corporate Governance: Goingfrom London to Milan
via Toronto, 10 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 5, 6 (1999); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as

History: The Prospectsfor Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 641 (1999); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Pathways to Corporate Convergence? Two Steps on the Road to ShareholderCapitalism in Germany, 5 COLUM. J. Eu. L.
219 (1999); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEo. L.J. 439 (2001); Edward B. Rock, America's Shifting Fascinationwith Comparative Corporate Governance, 74 WAsH. U. L.Q. 367 (1996); see also Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in CorporateOwnership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REv. 127 (1999). For other convergence pieces, see Mary E. Kissane, Global Gadflies: Applications and Implications of U.S.-Style Corporate Governance
Abroad, 17 N.Y.L. Scu. J. Irr'L & CoMP. L. 621 (1997); Gustavo Visentini, Compatibility

and Competition Between European and American CorporateGovernance: Which Model of
Capitalism?,23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 833 (1998).
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control large corporations feel considerable pressure to adopt the best of
such practices and structures gleaned from a global inventory.
Assuming that such a convergence is taking place, the further question
is toward what point are those global corporate governance vectors converging? According to United States scholars writing on the subject, with
little dissent, the agreement is that the convergence will be on a set of governance parameters that will replicate the American model of corporate
governance.8 The only debate involves questions such as whether convergence will be "formal," in the sense of adoption of United States style corporate legal regimes throughout the world, or "functional," in the sense of a
worldwide accord as to best practices. 9
Increasingly, corporate directors are familiar with governance developments in other nations. An Australian company director knows not only
what the Bosch Report in Australia 10 may dictate for her company but may
also be familiar with the Cadbury Code in the United Kingdom,' the
American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure,12 and the General Motors 29 Points in the United States. 13 The
Cadbury, Hampel, 14 and Greenbury 15 Reports in the United Kingdom
have influenced corporate law reform proposals in Germany 16 and in
France. 17 In that manner, to a degree at least, life has begun imitating art:
corporations are modeling their corporate governance practices based
8. But see William W. Bratton &Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative CorporateGovernance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM.J.
TRAN'L L. 213 (1999); Roberta Romano, A CautionaryNote on Drawing Lessons from Comparative CorporateLaw, 102 YALE LJ. 2021, 2036 (1993) (expressing reservations about
basing corporate law change on differences in short term national productivity rates and
terming "a dubious proposition" that "German and Japanese corporate governance
arrangements should be emulated by U.S. firms").
9. E.g., Coffee, supra note 7, at 679-80; Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate
Governance: Convergence of Form or Function (Dec. 5, 1998) (unpublished manuscript), cited in Coffee, supra note 7, at 649 n.27; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7,
at 459 n.35.
10. AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF COMPANY DIRECTORS ET AL., CORPORATE PRACTCES AND
CONDUCT (2d ed. 1993).
11. COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, THE CODE OF
BEST PRACTICE (London

1992).

12.

AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (1994).
13. GENERAL MOTORS BOARD OF DIRECTORS, GM BOARD GUIDELINES ON SIGNIFICANT

CoRPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES (rev. ed. 1995).

14. COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
FINAL REPORT (LONDON 1998).
15. DIRECTORS' REMUNERATION: REPORT OF A STUDY GROUP CHAIRED BY SIR RICHARD
GREENBURY (1995).
16. E.g., Thomas J. Andre, Jr., Cultural Hegemony: The Exportation of Anglo-Saxon
CorporateGovernance Ideologies to Germany, 73 TUL. L. REv. 69, 78-79, 109-16 (1998).
17. E.g., James A. Fanto, The Role of CorporateLaw in French CorporateGovernance,
31 CORNELL INT'L. LJ. 31, 87 (1998). But see id. at 87 n.286 ("A cynic might also suggest
that since U.S. scholars and practitioners produced their 'Principles of Corporate Governance' and their U.K counterparts their 'Cadbury Report,' the French felt obligated to
do the same, without acknowledging that they were simply following the Anglo-Saxon
model....").
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upon blueprints drawn up by academics, regulators and directors interested in the notion of corporate self-regulation.
But it is a limited phenomenon. There is no massive "global" convergence in corporate governance. At best the evidence is of some incomplete
transatlantic convergence with an outlier here and there.
In other cultures and economies great resentment exists toward United
States economic imperialism and Americanocentric notions of the United
States as the universal nation that, as unstated premises, underlie much of
the global convergence scholarship. The recent "Millennium" or "Seattle"
round of trade negotiations under the aegis of the World Trade Organization (WTO), with mass anti-WTO demonstrations, and the Washington,
D.C. protests at the annual meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, tell us further that there is significant opposition to
globalization of anything, whether led by the United States or otherwise.,,
Part I of this article reviews the United States global convergence
scholarship. Part II develops the theme that United States corporate regulation has never traveled well internationally as well as the complementary
theme that prior attempts at harmonization on an international scale have
failed badly. Those themes raise the question why convergence advocates
believe that United States style corporate governance will travel any better.
Part III points out the relative insularity and cultural insensitivity of
the United States scholarship. Convergence advocates posit convergence
based upon their study of capitalism in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and perhaps Japan. 19 They ignore most of the world's
remaining 6 billion people, the largest nations on earth (the People's
Republic of China, India, Indonesia), and the culture beneath law and economic systems that is as or more important than law or capitalism itself.
Cultural diversity militates against convergence.
18. And that opposition continues. E.g., undated flier posted in Forbes Quadrangle,
University of Pittsburgh, April, 2000 (on file with author):
Mobilization for Global Justice, Washington, D.C. In April the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund will hold their annual spring meetings in
Washington. As usual, their agenda includes making the world safer for corporations-and more dangerous for people and the planet. So join us as we call for
justice! Sunday, April 16, Non-violent direct action. Shut down the meetings!
...

For more information: www.a16.org.

Id.; see also Mark Helm, Seattle Protesters Target D.C.-Aiming to Disrupt Next Week's
World Bank-IMFJoint Meeting, PITTSBURGH PosT-GkzETTE, Apr. 10, 2000, at A5.
19. Since the economic crisis hit Asia, many United States scholars have deleted
Japan from their already artificially narrow sample of corporate governance jurisdictions. Rock, supra note 7, at 380-81 ("The tone of comparative corporate scholarship
has changed over the last few years as the U.S. economy has bounced back and Germany
and Japan have lagged."). The picture was radically different a few years earlier, with
many comparisons being made between Japanese and United States corporate governance styles. E.g.,J. Mark Ramseyer, Legal Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the Shadow
of Defection in Japan, 20J. LEGAL STUD. 91, 97-114 (1991);J. Mark Ramseyer, Takeovers

in Japan: Opportunism, Ideology, and CorporateControl, 35 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1987); Mark
J. Roe, Some Differences in CorporateStructure in Germany, Japan and the United States,
102 YALE LJ. 1927 (1993). See generally WILLIAM S. DIEnUCH, IN THE SHADOW OF THE
RISING SUN: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AiEICAN ECONOMIC DECLINE (1991).
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Part IV pursues the similar theme of economic, rather than cultural,
insensitivity. A rich literature, ignored by the global convergence advocates, exists on capitalism in contrasting cultures. While most (but not all)
nation states may now be said to have a capitalistic economic system, comparisons to United States and U.K. style capitalism are inapt. Worldwide
the prevailing form of capitalism is said to be an "embedded capitalism"
that serves and is integrated into the social order rather than the stand
alone, highly individualistic Reagan-Thatcher style of capitalism that, for
convergence advocates, constitutes the platonic form for capitalism everywhere. There are many cultures and many kinds of capitalism-family capitalism, managed capitalism, bamboo capitalism, crony capitalism, even
the gangster capitalism of modern day Russia-and most of them may be
ill-suited for United States style corporate governance.
Another worldwide phenomenon is backlash, chronicled in Part V.
From France to Indonesia and from South Africa to Sweden there is a backlash against passing off United States culture, including its economic and
legal culture, as universal ("one size fits all") culture that presents the obvious solution to national and regional problems. Coupled with the antiAmerican backlash is the growing world unrest with globalization, at the
least in the bulldozer-like form it takes in the thinking of multinational
corporations and international organizations such as the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund or the World Trade Organization, all of
which the world perceives as being controlled or dominated by the United
States. These powerful emerging forces of backlash militate against anything that could be said to be "global" convergence in corporate
governance.
Perhaps the best argument against global convergence in corporate
governance is its irrelevancy if, indeed, some convergence is taking place.
The recent growth of huge multinationals is the most striking worldwide
economic development of the late 1990s and the early 21st century.
United States style and traditional forms of corporate governance, which
respond to the Berle-Means separation of ownership from control and the
ensuing agency cost problem, simply are not responsive to the problems
the growth of large multinationals portend. Worker exploitation, degradation of the environment, economic imperialism, regulatory arbitrage, and
plantation production efforts by the growing stable of gargantuan multinationals, whose power exceeds that of most nation states, is far higher on
the global agenda than is convergence in governance. Part VI develops
those ideas.
The conclusion is that, simply put, most United States scholars have a
fundamental misunderstanding of what globalization is and what may be
expected of it. They share the view of United States multinationals and
much of the community of international organizations that globalization
means elimination of all barriers and differences-the promotion of homogeneity across the face of the earth-"globalization as a bulldozer."
Instead, globalization is a technological and telecommunications revolu-
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tion, a phenomenon of the information age, which will not necessarily
erase all differences and barriers between nations and cultures.
Globalization thus portends convergence but it will not be global. Further, what convergence does occur may not be United States dominated
but may occur around several disparate loci. Most importantly, the growth
of large multinational corporations renders the convergence advocacy relatively insignificant in the larger scale of things.
I.

Global Convergence in Corporate Governance Advocacy

A.

Introduction

In 1993, the author published the first United States treatise on corporate
governance. 20 The editors conducted a copyright search to insure the
title's availability. This manuscript was apparently the first, on this side of
the Atlantic at least, to lay claim to the title "Corporate Governance."
Today there is a flood of corporate governance scholarship, much of it
comparative. In March 2000 alone, on the Social Science Research Network, authors posted abstracts and/or drafts of eight comparative corporate governance articles, ranging from Corporate Governance Lessons from
Russian Enterprise Fiascoes,21 and Corporate Governance in Post-Privatized
Slovenia,2 2 to Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems of the
CorporateLaw and Their Solutions.2 3 Other papers do not include "Corporate Governance" in the title but do deal with some aspect of corporate
24
governance, pursuing a comparative theme.
20. DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1993).
21. Merritt B. Fox & Michael A. Heller, Corporate Governance Lessons from Russian

EnterpriseFiascoes, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1720 (2000), availableat Social Science Research
Network Electronic Paper Collection, abstract_id 203368 (1999).

22. Rado Bohinc & Stephen M. Bainbridge, CorporateGovernance in Post-Privatized
Slovenia, available at Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection,
abtract.id 199548 (1999).
23. Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems of the
CorporateLaw and their Solutions, Columbia Law School Working Paper No. 153, available at Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection, abstract_id 163377
(1999). Other papers included Marcello Bianchi & Luca Enriques, Corporate Governance in Italy After the 1998 Reform: What Role for Institutional Investors?, available at
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection, abstractid 203112
(2001); Cheffins, supra note 7; Curtis J. Milhaupt, Privatization and Corporate Governance: Strategy for a Unified Korea, available at SSRN Electronic Paper Collection
abstractid 203548 (1999); COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, CODE OF BEST PRAcTICE FOR CoRPoRATE GOVERNANCE (KOREA)

(1999).

24. E.g., Laurence Bloch & Elizabeth Kremp, Ownership and Voting Power in France,
available at Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection, abstract_id
200632 (1999); Laura N. Beny, A Comparative EmpiricalInvestigationof Agency and Market Theories of Insider Trading, available at Social Science Research Network Electronic
Paper Collection, abstractid 193070 (1999); Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The
World Price of Insider Trading, available at Social Science Research Network Electronic
Paper Collection, abstractid 200914; Jeffrey Lawrence & G.P. Stapledon, Is Board Composition Important? A Study of Listed Australian Companies, available at Social Science
Research Network Electronic Paper Collection, abstractid 193528 (1999).
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None of that corporate governance scholarship postulates a global
convergence. Indeed, some of it demonstrates a decided lack of convergence, such as the failure of a Westernized corporation law in Russia 25 or
the conscious choice in post-privatized Slovenia for extensive labor involvement in governance and a statutory scheme along the lines of German codetermination, 26 or the empirical demonstration that in Australia at least
American style boards comprised of independent directors do not increase
27
corporate profitability.
Undaunted, United States scholars continue to predict the hegemony
of United States governance. Some of these predictions take the form of
bald assertions, with little analysis or citation. For example, in France family style capitalism is the overwhelmingly dominant form. 28 The French
government promotes dispersed ownership and United States style market
capitalism as a means of strengthening an economy that has been in a protracted slump, but without great success.
Nonetheless, the very scholar who makes those observations asserts
that "technological changes and the globalization of the economy are pushing corporate governance worldwide towards a United States style market
capitalism." 2 9 In the same vein, after discussing the potential influence of
culture on shareholder manager relationships, he concludes:
Yet, like economic destiny, corporate governance is no longer entirely under
the control of any nation state. Indeed, corporate law scholars debate
whether a transformation in the world business environment has [already]
caused a "convergence"30of corporate governance whereby cultural factors are
losing their influence.
B.

Global Convergence Based upon European Developments

A more analytical treatment reviews several manifestations of global convergence in European and European Union harmonization efforts. 3 1 Thus
the Frankfurt and London stock exchanges agreed to (and later abandoned) a merger that also involved a 20 percent participation by the

French.3 2 The European Union (EU) has pushed hard for standardization
of the accounting rules used in its 15 member states. 33 The Paris based
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has
25. See, e.g., Fox & Heller, supra note 21.
26. Bohinc & Bainbridge, supra note 22, at 1-2.
27. Lawrence & Stapledon, supra note 24, at 27.
28. Bloch & Kremp, supra note 24, at 18.
29. Fanto, supra note 17, at 32.
30. Id. at 33.
31. Cunningham, supra note 7, at 1148-52.
32. Id. at 1151-52; see also Edmund L. Andrews, London and Frankfurt Stock
Exchanges Form Alliance, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1998, at D4; Alan Cowell, French Agree to a
European Stock Exchange, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 20, 1998, at C6. But see Erik Portanger &
Vanessa Fuhrmans, How It Became a Foggy Day on the London Exchange, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 2, 2000, at C1.
33. Cunningham, supra note 7, at 1148.
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promulgated a Code of Conduct for Multinational Corporations. 3 4 Large
multinational corporations such as DaimlerChrysler list their shares both
on European and United States stock exchanges. 35 The SEC has been
working with the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO) to develop international standards for nonfinancial statement
36
disclosure.
Given that evidence and its largely United States-European bias, it
seems a stretch to conclude that "[c]ross border alliances among businesses are leading to the articulation of a new global corporate governance
'3 7
template which uses existing tools to build a new corporate world order.
The statement seems disproportionately outsized for the evidence
presented which is, after all, only of EU and transatlantic developments.
C.

Convergence in the Quest for Equity Capital

Professor John Coffee, an eminent scholar always in the forefront of new
thought, predicts global convergence through "the backdoor," so to speak,
as foreign firms seek stock exchange listings in the United States and thus
make themselves subject to United States style corporate governance
norms.3 8 Foreign issuers arrive on United States shores because of the
strength of United States capital markets. In turn, the strength of United
States capital markets stems from the protection United States law extends
39
to minority investors in United States enterprises.
Foreign issuers come to United States shores, however, because that is
where the money is, not because of the protection United States law may
once have given to minority share interests. And the United States supply
of capital is not inexhaustible and is not exclusive. There is money elsewhere in the world, lots of it in fact, in Frankfurt, London, Zurich, Johannesburg, Riyadh, Milan, Sydney and Singapore, to name a few international
banking centers. In fact, in February 2000, perhaps aware of strong capital
markets in East Asia, seven United States high tech firms listed their com40
mon shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.
34. Id. at 1171; see OECD, The OECD Guidelinesfor Multinational Enterprises, at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/investment/guidelines/index.htm (last modified Apr. 5,

2001).
35. Cunningham, supra note 7, at 1170.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1194.
38. See generally Coffee, supra note 7 (stating that functional convergence in corporate governance is arriving at the level of securities regulation and stock exchange
requirements). On February 21-23, 2000, Professor Coffee expounded on a similar
theme in delivering the Julius Rosenthal Foundation Lectures at Northwestern University School of Law, entitled "The Public Corporation in the Global Era." John C. Coffee,
Jr., Address at the Julius Rosenthal Foundation Lecture Series, Northwestern University
School of Law (Feb. 21-23, 2000) (brochure on file with author).
39. Coffee, supra note 7, at 644, 698.
40. See International Developments: Seven NASDAQ Stocks to be Available in Hong
Kong in Pilot Program,31 SEc, REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1654 (Dec. 20, 1999) (noting Hong
Kong listings for Microsoft, Intel, Cisco, Dell Computer, Amgen, Applied Materials and

Starbucks Coffee).
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The protection of minority shareholdings in United States publicly
traded ventures is also yesterday's, or the day before yesterday's, news. The
odds of a minority shareholder obtaining a hearing on her complaint in the
United States corporate court, the Delaware Chancery Court, are overwhelmingly against the plaintiff investor. Delaware has crafted a number
of procedural obstacles to prevent an investor from ever arguing the merits
41
of her case, let alone obtaining relief.
Under the other principal United States corporate law regime, the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act, the drafters of that statute have
adopted a number of even more draconian measures designed to insure
that minority shareholders' complaints never see the light of day. These
measures include a universal demand rule that never excuses demand on
the board of directors as "futile," 42 and an absolute prohibition on court
review of directors' actions refusing a demand to commence litigation. 4 3
The reputation of the United States legal system for protection of
minority investors in corporations is no longer grounded in reality. It is
probably not a sustainable reputational advantage for the United States
corporate governance regime. Arguably, then, neither the United States's
largely historical protection of minority investors nor the existence of an
inexhaustible pool of capital will induce the spread of United States style
corporate governance. 44
D. Convergence by Bald Assertion: "The End of History for Corporate
Law"

A recent paper by two elites in the United States academy is a chauvinistic
41. For example, if the investor corresponds with the corporation in any way, she
may be deemed to have made a demand on the board of directors and thus have tacitly
conceded the independence of the board for purposes of dealing with the demand. Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767 (Del. 1990). If the corporation refuses the demand, a
court may not review the board's decision that the minority shareholder's suit is not in
the corporation's best interests. Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194 (Del. 1991). Pursuit of
another avenue to a court hearing, that demand is excused because a critical mass of the
corporation's directors are not disinterested, has also been made extremely difficult in
Delaware. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). Under the substantive law of
Delaware, corporate directors are free to discriminate among shares of the same class,
including minority held shares, because Delaware requires only "fair" treatment, not
"equal" treatment of shares. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993).
42. MODEL Bus. Corn'. Acr § 7.40 (1993).
43. Id. § 7.44(a). See generally Douglas M. Branson, Recent Changes to the Model
Business CorporationAct: Death Knells for Main Street Corporation Law, 72 NEB. L. REV.
258 (1993) (explaining in their attempt to compete with the American Law Institute
Corporate Governance Project, model act drafters adopted a governance and litigation
model inappropriate for small and mid sized corporations).
44. Stock market demutualization, with resulting private ownership of the London
Stock Exchange, the New York Stock Exchange, or the NASDAQ, as well as others, may
blunt governance initiatives by those organizations, further undercutting Professor Coffee's thesis of convergence by the backdoor. E.g., Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements, 54 SMU L. RE. 325, 326 & 348-52 (2001).
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statement of the Americanocentric convergence thesis. 45 These two scholars contend that in the United States the supreme, or platonic, form of
corporate governance structure has evolved. Both logic and competitive
pressures to adopt the ideal United States shareholder-oriented model of
corporate governance are irresistible and will result (or already have
resulted) in its dominance around the globe. Thus, the authors posit an
"end of history for corporate law," that is, an end for continued evolution
of corporate law or of advocacy of competing governance models. The
ideal has been achieved.
The evidence these two scholars set out in support of their thesis
largely consists of bald assertions. Thus, "[r]ecent years ... have brought
strong evidence of a growing consensus on [convergence] issues among the
46
academic, business, and governmental elites in leading jurisdictions."
Continuing, "at the beginning of the twenty-first century we are witnessing
rapid convergence on the standard shareholder-oriented model as a normative view of corporate structure and governance. We should also expect this
normative convergence to produce substantial convergence in the practices
of corporate governance and in corporate law."4 7
After asserting on very little, if any, evidence that competing governance models (labor, stakeholder, team production, family capitalism) no
longer have any role to play, the authors tell us that "[lt]he shareholder48
oriented model has emerged as the normative consensus," and that in the
competition engendered by international product and financial markets,
according to
"lilt is now widely thought that firms organized and operated
49
the shareholder-oriented model have had the upper hand."
The preferences of international equity markets and institutional
investors for the shareholder model also lead to the conclusion that "[o]ver
time, then, the standard [American] model is likely to win the competitive
struggle .... -5o Ergo, "no important competitors5 1to the standard model of
corporate governance remain persuasive today."
Globally, then, we will witness the dominance of the United States
model, with the "appointment of larger numbers of independent directors
to boards of directors, reduction in overall board size, development of powerful board committees dominated by outsiders (such as audit committees,
compensation committees, and nominating committees), closer links
between management compensation and the value of the firm's equity
securities, and strong communication between board members and institu45. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7. The title The End of History derives from
either FRANcis FUOYAmA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992) or FRANcis
FUKuyAMA, THE END OF HIsToRY (1998).

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 440.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 449.
Id. at 450 (citation omitted).
Id. at 451.
Id. at 454.
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tional shareholders." 5 2
On and on, the authors progress through a series of categorical statements to the preordained conclusion that
[t]he triumph of the shareholder-oriented model of the corporation over its
principal competitors is now assured, even if it was problematic as recently
as twenty-five years ago. Logic alone did not establish the superiority of this
standard model or of the prescriptive rules that it implies... [T]he standard
model earned its position as the dominant model of the large corporation
the hard way, by out-competing during the post-World War I period the...
alternative models of corporate governance ....53

Thus, apparently we are told, in Asia or Africa, in South America or the
former Russian republics, as well as in Europe, and everywhere else on the
globe, there is only one way-the American way.
E. A Critique of the Global Convergence Advocacy Scholarship
This section makes five points, two of them briefly and three in more
detailed sections that follow. They are: (1) the existing convergence scholarship engages in a high degree of pontification, with little evidence in support of assertions made and seemingly consciously unmindful of authority
to the contrary; (2) the existing scholarship is highly inbred, ignoring work
of scholars at lesser known institutions or in other fields and citing almost
exclusively work by a few scholars at a handful of elite institutions; (3)
when the convergence scholars do assemble evidence in support of their
thesis the sample is an extremely narrow one from which to postulate
"global" anything; (4) the advocacy of the United States model as global
demonstrates an extreme lack of cultural understanding and sensitivity,
ignoring countless cultures and billions of persons for whom United States
style corporate governance would never be acceptable; and (5) implicit in
this advocacy scholarship is the assumption that only one economic
model, that which places efficiency and profit in the ascendancy, is acceptable. The reality is that in most of the world other economic models,
grouped generically under "embedded capitalism," govern human and fictional beings' (corporations') lives, goals and aspirations.
1. A High Degree of Pontification

In much of this scholarship we are told we must accept major and minor
premise as well as conclusion because the authors say so. For example, a
major premise in The End of Historyfor CorporateLaw is that models advo-

cating a role for labor representation in corporate governance are now dead
letters, 54 as are the more far ranging "stakeholder models" along similar
lines, 55 because the authors say so.

52. Id. at 455. This is, of course, the American Law Institute's model. AMERICAN
supra note 12; see BRANSON, supra note 20, at 227-45 (1993).
53. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 468.

LAW INsnTruTE,

54. Id. at 444-46.
55. Id. at 447-49.
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Yet a substantial body of corporate law scholarship to the contrary,
much of it recent, exists, in the United States alone. Recent tides include
The Place of Workers in Corporate Law,56 Organized Labor as Shareholder
Activists: Building Coalitions to Promote Worker Capitalism,57 and The
Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor58
Management Cooperation.
Along the lines of the broader stakeholder model, one respected
scholar alone has authored New Directionsin Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians,and the Crisis in Corporate Law,5 9 Theories of the Corporation,60 and Redefining Corporate Law.6 1 A recent, and well-received,
volume of essays largely devotes itself to the stakeholder model and vari62
ants thereon.
Statutory drafters around the world also continue attempts to impose
responsibilities on workers and stakeholders, if not through their direct
participation in governance, then as a matter of corporate law. 63 How
global convergences advocates ignore this evidence of divergence, or at
least divergence from their opinions, is explainable only as a matter of
hubris.
2.

Inbred Scholarship

When many of the global convergence advocates do cite to authority the
leading scholars in an area are not cited unless, of course, those scholars
are in the select inner circle of elites. In End of History for CorporateLaw,
the only works cited on labor participation in governance are by one of the
56. Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283
(1998).
57. Marleen A. O'Connor, Organized Labor as Shareholder Activist: Building Coalitions to Promote Worker Capitalism, 31 U. RICH. L. REv. 1345 (1997).
58. Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human CapitalEra: Reconceptualizing CorporateLaw
to FacilitateLabor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 899 (1993); see also
O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation'sNexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary
Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991); David Millon, Default
Rules, Wealth Distribution, and CorporateLaw Reform: Employment at Will Versus Job
Security, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 975 (1998).

59. David Millon, New Directions in CorporateLaw: Communitarians,Contractarians,
and the Crisis in CorporateLaw, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373 (1993).

60. David Mllon,Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DuKEIJ. 201 (1990).
61. David Millon, Redefining CorporateLaw, 24 IND. L. REV. 223 (1991).
62. LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (1995).

63. In the United States, over 30 jurisdictions have adopted non-shareholder constituency statutes, directing or permitting corporate directors to take into account interests
of stakeholders other than shareholders. E.g., BRANSON, supra note 20, § 8.03; Stephen
M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971,
985-86 (1992); Timothy L. Fort, The CorporationAs Mediating Institution:An Efficacious

Synthesis of Stakeholder Theory and CorporateConstituency Statutes, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 173, 173-74 (1997). In many foreign jurisdictions, the stakeholder model has
struck a responsive note. For example, recent Korean (enacted) and Indonesian (in progress) codes of best practices have chapters devoted to directors' and managers' responsibilities to stakeholders. COMMITTEE ON CoRoRAE GOVERNANCE (KoREA), CODE OF BEST
PRACTICE FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Part IV (1999); NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (INDONESIA), CODE OF GOOD COPORATE GOVERNANCE, Chapter 6
(2000) ("Stakeholders").
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co-authors himself.6 4 In another recent piece of global convergence scholarship by two elites, in 58 footnotes the co-authors cite to their own works
33 times. In two or three other instances they cite to publications by other
65
scholars, but in works one or the other co-author has edited.
3.

A Narrow, and Unrepresentative, Sample for Postulation of "Global
Convergence"

It is surprising just how teetering the thin base upon which the convergence hypothesis rests is. The convergence advocates presume that the
United States and U.K. corporate law and corporate governance regimes
are identical, or nearly so, which of course they are not. United States
corporate law has become relentlessly enabling while increasingly British
company law has become prescriptive, with countless substantive commands and minimum requirements. 6 6 The two bodies of law have
67
diverged but the convergence advocates never examine the differences.
As has been seen, examination of the Japanese corporate law model
waxes and wanes. 68 Thus it is that the advocates of the "global" convergence hypothesis focus on developments in the United States, the United
Kingdom, France and Germany. 69 Outliers (limited to brief mention) are
74
73
72
the Czech Republic, 70 Italy, 7 1 the Netherlands, Israel and Korea.
That is the total sample from which it is argued that a worldwide, or
64. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 446 n.9 (citing HENRY HANSMANN, THE
OWNERSHIP OP ENTERPRISE (1996)); Henry Hansmann, Probleme von Kollektiventscheidungen und Theorie der Firma- Folgerungenfur die Arbeitnehmermitbestimmung, in
OKONOMISCHE ANALYsE DEs UNTERNEHMENSCRECHTS 287-305 (Claus Ott & Hans-Bernd
Schafer eds., 1993); Henry Hansmann, Worker Participationand Corporate Governance,
43 U. TORONTo LJ. 589, 589-606 (1993).
65. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 7, at 136 n.13, 137 nn.17-18, 138 nn.19-20,
22.

66. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Countertrends in CorporateLaw: Model Business
CorporationAct Revision, British Company Law Reform, and Principlesof CorporateGovernance and Structure, 68 MINN. L.REv. 53, 73-88 (1983); Douglas M. Branson, Teaching
ComparativeCorporateGovernance: The Significanceof "Soft Law" and InternationalInstitutions, 34 GA. L. REv. 669, 682-84 (2000).
67. Although one result of both legal systems is the same, that is, a pattern of dispersed share ownership and a large number of publicly held corporations per given
amount of population, see Coffee, supra note7, at 644 (noting that "while the United
Kingdom has thirty-six listed firms per million citizens and the United Sates has thirty,
France, Germany, and Italy have only eight, four and five, respectively") (citation omitted), convergence advocates do not ask why that is so because they presume, without
examination or research, that United States corporation law and British company law
are largely identical.
68. See supra note 19; see also Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 7, at 164; Coffee, supra
note 7, at 653, 680; Cunningham, supra note 7, at 1142. Today, most references to
Japanese style corporate governance are made in passing.
69. See Bebchuk & Roe, supranote 7, at 133 (focusing on the United Kingdom), 136,
140-41, 150 (focusing on Germany); Coffee, supra note 7, at 644, 653, 663-64 (focusing
on Germany); id. at 644, 653, 656 (focusing on France); id at 644-53 (focusing on the
United Kingdom); Cunningham, supra note 7, at 1136-39 (focusing on the United Kingdom); id. at 1140-42 (focusing on Germany); id. at 1141-42 (focusing on France);
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 445-46 (focusing on Germany); id. at 446-47
(focusing on France); id. at 447-48 (focusing on the United Kingdom).
70. Coffee, supra note 7, at 697.
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"global," convergence on United States style corporate governance norms is
occurring or, indeed, is a fait accompli.
The convergence advocates ignore the nature of economies, legal systems and corporate governance on the Pacific Rim or in South and Central
American, even though the Pacific Rim (population 3.8 billion) 7 5 and
South America (population 734 million) 76 are often thought to be the
emerging economies of the 21st century. Convergence advocates construct
competing models based upon a limited sample of, on the one hand, the
United States (population 270 million), and, on the other hand, the U.K.
77
(population 59 million), Germany (82 million) and France (59 million).
They then declare the United States the winner of the competition. Last of
all, they project that winning model over a world inhabited by 6 billion
people, with an endless variety of cultures, economic and legal systems,
and goals and aspirations.
There is an extreme skepticism and indeed distrust born of such advocacy by United States based scholars of the notion that United States style
principles are universal truths. The former Prime Minister of Singapore,
speaking of the potential twilight of Occidental style capitalism and the
rise of Asia and the Pacific Rim as economic powers, described the uniqueness of Asian institutions:
for America to be displaced, not in the world, but only in the Western Pacific
... is emotionally very difficult [for American policy makers] to accept.
The sense of cultural supremacy of the Americans will make this adjustment
most difficult. Americans believe their ideas are universal-[for example]

the supremacy of the individual
and free, unfettered expression. But they
78
are not-they never were.

Convergence advocates' use of outliers, while laudable, may also be
suspect. One advocate of convergence cites the great number of foreign
listings on United States stock exchanges as evidence of forthcoming convergence. 7 9 The advocate points to a number of Israeli high tech firms that
have listed shares on the NASDAQ.80 Yet the greatest number of "foreign"
listings on NASDAQ and the New York Stock Exchange remains listings by
Canadian corporations.8 1 Canadian firms' listings combined with one out71.
65.
72.
73.
74.

75.

Bebchuk & Roe, supranote 7, at 165, 169; Coffee, supra note 7, at 644, 649,663Cunningham, supra note 7, at 1140-41; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7.
Coffee, supra note 7, at 675-76.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 451.
PRiMEDIA REFERENCE, INC., THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTs

1999, at 863

(1998). The population of Asia alone was estimated to be 3,527,969,000 in 1998. Id.
76. See id. at 862-63.
77. Id. at 863.
78. Interview with Lee Kuan Yew, 13 Nav PERsp. Q. 4 (1996).
79. Coffee, supra note 7, at 673 n.107 (citing Amir N. Licht, Regulatory Arbitragefor
Real: InternationalSecurities Regulation in A World InteractingSecuritiesMarket, 38 VA.J.
INT'L L. 563, 566 (1998) (noting that as of Dec. 31, 1996, foreign listings totaled 416 on
the NASDAQ and 305 on the New York Stock Exchange)).
80. Coffee, supra note 7, at 675.
81. Id.
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lier group hardly constitute robust evidence of "global" convergence.
II. The Failure of Attempts at Export of Legal Institutions,
Harmonization, and Globalization
A. Failed Attempts at Export
United States corporate law has traveled very few places. 82 The drafters of
the Russian corporation law took United States legislation as one starting
point,8 3 but even the drafters now admit that the Russian statute has been
a failure, perhaps due as much to weak enforcement as to weak principles
84
of law.
By contrast, at least historically, British company law and company
institutions have traveled very well.8 5 On the Pacific Rim, for instance,

Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and
India have British company law. 86 South Africa, which has a Roman Dutch
civil law, also has British company law. So, too with former British colonies: Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia), Zambia (Northern Rhodesia),
Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya, and Egypt have British company law. The reach
of British company law has not been confined to former colonies.
Namibia, the former German Southwest Africa, has a civilian legal system
87
but British company law. Ghana is similar.
The prevalence of British company law may be due to path dependency, but not completely. With its highly regulatory content, protection
of minorities, and other features, British company law apparently adapts
well to less developed countries (LDCs) and newly industrializing countries (NICs) better than does open ended "enabling" United States corporation law.
82.

ALFRD

F.

CONARD,

CORPORaTIONS

IN PERsPEcTIVE

75-76 (1976) (stating that

United States corporate laws have been "peculiarly inept for export."). But see Brian R.
Cheffins, U.S. Close Corporation Legislation: A Model Canada Should Not Follow, 35
McGILL LJ. 160, 161 (1989) ("U.S. corporate legislation considerably influenced the
thinking of Canadian corporate law reformers in the 1960s and 1970s.").
83. Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of CorporateLaw, 109
I-u~v. L. REv. 1911, 1935-36, 1946-49 (1996).
84. E.g., Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatizationand CorporateGovernance:What

Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1731, 1752-57 (2000); see also Fox & Heller, supra note
21, at 1762-64.
85. Cheffins, supranote 7, at 6 ("The work which has been done in the United Kingdom has spurred reviews of corporate governance in markets around the world and has
provided a yardstick against which investment frameworks in other countries are
measured.").
86. Robert I. Tricker, Corporate Governance: A Ripple on the Cultural Reflection, in
CAPITALSM IN CONTRASTING CULTURES 187 (Stewart R. Clegg & S. Gordon Redding eds.,
1990).
87. Transplant of other countries' laws is highly, but not completely, path dependent. Thus, receiving countries may, to some degree, pick and choose from alternatives
when a legal system is being transplanted. See, e.g., David Berkowitz et al., Economic
Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, CID Working Paper No. 39, at 4, 11
(2000) (on file with the author) (analyzing forty-nine countries with "transplanted" legal
systems).
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The relative lack of portability for United States corporate law then
should give some pause to global convergence advocates. If United States
corporate law has fared so poorly, why posit that United States style corporate governance will travel so much better?
B.

Harmonization and Standardization Failures

Attempts to harmonize corporate law, especially its governance aspects, in
the EU have been a dismal failure. The Draft Fifth Company Law Directive
seeks to impose German-style co-determination on the member states and
corporations chartered by them.8 8 The British have strenuously opposed
mandated labor participation in governance while other EU member states
are lukewarm about the prospect. The Draft Fifth Directive is permanently
stalled.8 9
The EU has also proposed a pan-European company, the Societas
Europea, but that proposal has also stumbled badly because of its incorporation of co-determination features. 90 The staff of the Council of the EU
recently announced an effort to simplify and retrench on less controversial
elements of company law harmonization as well 9 1
EU efforts have gone beyond harmonization and promotion of the
four freedoms which are at the core of the Union. 9 2 Those efforts have
exceeded any mandate the Council and the Commission may have had,
proceeding in the direction of uniform laws and standards throughout the
Union. That overzealousness has produced a backlash, making legitimate
harmonization more difficult to achieve.
Professor Paul Stephan has extensively analyzed harmonization and
88. See Proposal for a Fifth Directive, Foundation Article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty
Concerning the Structure of Public Limited Companies and the Powers and Obligations
of Their Origins, 1983 OJ. (C240) 2. The draft contains two alternative but mandatory
structures for providing employee representation in corporate governance. See id.
89. Terence L. Blackburn, The Societas Europea: The Evolving European Corporation
Statute, 61 FoRDHAm L. REV. 695, 735-36 & 700 (1993).
90. Id. at 700-01.
91. See Caroline De Vos, The SLIM IV Project of the European Commission: Harmonization Through Deregulation of European Company Law, Working Paper 199916, Financial Law Institute, University of Gent, available at Social Science Research Network
Electronic Paper Collection, abstract_id 192136 (1999).
92. See George A. Bermann, Comparative Law in the New European Community, 21
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 865, 867 (1998) ("The experience of the last forty years
also shows that pursuit of a 'neutral' harmonization or convergence of national law has
consistently been subordinate to the Community's pursuit of its own distinctive, policydriven legislative agenda."); George A. Bermann, A Commenaryt on the Harmonizationof
European Private Law, 1 TUL. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 47, 48-52 (1993) (stating that the
European Union has moved beyond regulating member states and regulation of their
economies into defining rights and obligations of citizens of member states vis-a-vis one
another). The four freedoms are the freedom of movement for goods, workers, services,
and capital. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11, 18, 36-42; see also id. art. 2 (establishing the European Economic Community). Preservation of the four freedoms remains a central objective of the now European Union. PETERJ. GROVES, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 7-8 (1995).
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standardization efforts on an international scale.9 3 His work points to several reasons such efforts are fated to achieve only minimal success, at best.
C.

Lack of Political Accountability and Rent Seeking as Obstacles to
Global Convergence

In the international sphere, promotional efforts on behalf of harmonization are apt to encounter skepticism at the national level. The authors of
such international efforts lack the political accountability of elected and
appointed officials at national and local levels. 9 4 "In free and democratic
societies, we insist on... a right to investigate and criticize lawmakers ...
[ijnternational lawmakers largely face weaker constraints on their behavior."9 5 When faced with international or "global" proposals akin to law,

the nation state may view the proposals with a greater degree of skepticism: "The domestic decisionmaker, even if a bureaucrat, still bears some
political accountability for its choices; the international lawmaker does
not. What underlies the skeptical position is a belief that the more
96
accountable decisionmaker should receive the benefit of the doubt."
International unification and harmonization efforts also encounter
skepticism because they lack the transparency of local lawmaking: "interest
groups tend to have somewhat lower costs of expressing their preferences
to executives engaged in international lawmaking than in conveying their
wishes to domestic legislators, and.., the general public has higher moni97
toring costs with respect to international lawmaking."
Lack of transparency in turn can result in a greater rate of rent seeking
in efforts such as the one to promote global corporate governance. Economic rents are returns in excess of what is necessary to keep a given
resource, including a human resource, from transferring to some other
occupation. 98 Thus, "rents are earned only by owners of resources that
cannot be augmented rapidly and at low cost to meet an increased demand
for the goods [or services] that are used to produce." 99 In every jurisdic93. Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International
Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 743 (1999) [hereinafter Stephan, Futility of Unification]; Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and
Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J. INr'L L. & Bus. 681 (1997) [hereinafter Stephan, Rules, Rents and
Legitimacy]; Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law-Legitimacy, Accountability,
Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1555 (1999) [herinafter Stephan, New InternationalLaw].
94. This is because "[n]o mechanism exists for voters to pass judgment on the international lawmakers. At best they can vote for the domestic governments that in turn
choose the drafters of international agreements." Stephan, Futility of Unification, supra
note 93, at 752.
95. Stephan, Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, supra note 93, at 682.
96. Id. at 732.
97. Id. at 699.
98. RIcHARD G. LIPSEY & PETER 0. STEINER, ECONOMics 341-42 (3d ed. 1972).
99. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMiC ANALYSIS OF LAw 9 (2d ed. 1977). Examples of

rent seeking include "the very high incomes earned by a few singers, athletes, and lawyers ... due to the scarcity of the resources they control-a fine singing voice, athletic
skill and determination .... " Id.
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tion, there exist various kinds of rent seekers who will attempt to foil
efforts at harmonization or globalization.
The cadre of lawyers who specialize in corporate law, earning rents
from their ability to explain the nuances of the status quo and to manipulate existing regulatory structures, may oppose simplification and harmonization efforts. In every jurisdiction, too, there exists a more elite inner
circle of attorneys and advisers who earn economic rents as the gatekeepers trusted by legislators and government ministers when harmonization
and globalization efforts reach the level of the nation state. They may foil
such efforts unless the way is clear for their rent-seeking to continue. 10 0
Finally, bureaucrats will decrease transparency and engage in turf protection because they will feel threatened by harmonization-unification and the
end of their ability to engage in rent seeking. 10 1
Change in corporate law and attempted imposition from above of
"global" standards of corporate governance will at some point be slowed, if
not stopped, by some of the same obstacles other international efforts at
unification or harmonization of economic laws and structures have
encountered.1 0 2 The lack of transparency perceived to exist in some such
efforts, the lack of political accountability, the pretentious and condescending "we know better" tone of much of the convergence advocacy, and rentseeking (as well as perceptions that rent seeking is occurring at the global
level) all may impede convergence.
D. The Myth of Globalization
1.

Introduction

The creation of the large multinational corporate organization in ways that
will open up channels of communication about corporate governance,
100. A related impediment to change in legal institutions may be a network externality. A legal institution gains value only after a critical mass of others has also decided to

adapt to the new way. An "actual" network market would be for fax machines: one
machine is useless, a community of them gives rise to an entire new industry. See, e.g.,
Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86
CAL. L. REv. 479, 488 (1998). Network economic effects pose an impediment to refinements or more radical change of corporate law. Id. at 562-86. Network externalities,
even if not expressed in those terms, may be excuses that rent seekers utilize to prolong
adherence to the "old" ways.
101. Stephan, Rents, Rules and Legitimacy, supra note 93, at 706 (noting that, other
things being equal, bureaucrats rent seek through efforts to enlarge their budgets).
102. Indeed, the elite and somewhat dosed circle of global convergence advocates
may be perceived as rent seekers themselves, engendering skepticism as a "one size fits
all" corporate governance scheme is peddled from country to country around the globe.
Rent seeking does occur at the international, as well as the local level. Stephan, Rents,

Rules and Legitimacy, supra note 93, at 708-09; Stephan, Futility of Unification,supra note
93, at 793 ("An essential element of the critique of technocratic lawmaking at the international level rests on the premise that interest groups can influence the process ...
[tihese [local] concerns about international lawmaking seem plausible precisely because
a substantial body of evidence suggests that such rentseeking takes place with some
frequency at the national level."). Indeed, the convergence advocates may actually be
rent seekers, judging from the amount of academic resource and reputation they have
invested in the "global" convergence hypothesis.
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leading to convergence, and which many of the convergence advocates cite
as prime evidence of their thesis, is the exception and not the rule. The
Daimler-Chrysler or Deutsche Bank-Bankers Trust combinations are not
representative of what empirical evidence demonstrates is occurring. In an
important new book, The Myth of the Global Corporation (Myth), 10 3 the
authors demonstrate that globalization is not taking place, or at least not
occurring along the lines the legal elites assert.
2.

"Good" GlobalizationVersus "Bad" Globalization

Good, healthy globalization would be characterized by technology diffusion as well as other types of decentralization. Large multinational corporations (MNCs) would be transferring research and development (R&D)
efforts to satellite operations in a meaningful way. Some of those receiving
satellites would be located in newly industrializing countries (NICs) and
perhaps in less developed countries (LDCs) as well. MNCs would be
engaged in significant direct foreign investment (DFI). Forming subsidiaries and joint ventures in countries around the globe, MNCs would be making significant investments in plant and other production facilities, in
modernization efforts, and in human resources so as to be able to decentralize financial, marketing and other "nerve center" aspects of their businesses. Simultaneously, MNCs would be shaking free from their roots and
national origins, converging on a global model of governance and
operation.
But "[tihe global corporation is mainly an American myth": 10 4
The ...idea[ ]that mobile corporations freed from political interference are

now somehow arbitraging diverse national structures and forcing an involuntary process of convergence or an inevitable trend toward openness...
marks a road to discord. On the surface, there is indeed a certain process of
homogenization at work in a world where Americans drive BMWs, Germans
listen to Sony CD players, and Japanese eat McDonald's hamburgers. But
below the surface, where the roots of leading MNCs remain lodged, our
research indicates durable sources of resistance to fundamental economic
convergence. 105

Contrary to
lustily they sing
Davos or Aspen,
tinue to differ
6
objectives." 10

103.
104.
105.
radical
expect
106.

what global convergence advocates state, and "however
from the same hymnbook when they gather together in
the leaders of the world's great business enterprises conin their most fundamental strategic behavior and

PAUL N. DOREMUS ET AL., TuE MYTH OF THE GLOBAL CORPORATION (1998).
Id. at 143.
Id. at 146. In fact, the authors of Myth surprised themselves: "Neither liberal nor
approaches to understanding multinational corporate behavior . . .led us to
the degree of continuing diversity we found at the level of the firm." Id. at 141.
Id. at 144.
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Lack of Widespread Direct Foreign Investment or Technology Diffusion

Worldwide DFI has expanded dramatically, from $500 billion United
States 1in
the early 1980s to $2.0 trillion United States in the early
1990S. 0 7 Yet, as the authors of Myth demonstrate, DFI remains concentrated in developed nations that are members of the OECD, or in a truncated version of that list. Japan still closes its border to significant DFI. 10 8
EU domestic content requirements discourage inward investment in EU
member countries.1 0 9 The spreading of wealth and the globalization that
high absolute DFI numbers might portend is not occurring.
Tracking the volume of international royalty and license fee transactions, as well as other statistics, the economist authors of Myth ask, "Is a
global technology base emerging?" 110 They conclude that hard evidence
suggests it is not: "MNCs move R&D abroad far more slowly than production, sourcing, marketing, and other business activities .... MNCs con-

duct relatively little R&D outside the home country."' 1 ' Japanese foreign
affiliates have "low R&D intensity."' 12 Thus, "[d]evelopment of new tech113
nology remains centralized in the home market operations of MNCs."
The roots for future globalization, or for high quality globalization, are not
being put down.
4.

The Resiliency of IncorporatingNation States and Their Cultures

Even in the transnational mergers which global convergence advocates feature prominently in their writing, the authors find that one culture (belief
114
system) extinguishes the other, rather than convergence taking place.
National differences persist-are "'hard wired' into core corporate structures" and "embody distinctive and durable ideologies or, as some analysts
now prefer to call them, belief-systems." 115 Thus, the authors note "an
array of evidence documenting striking differences between the behavior
of most continentally based firms and their counterparts in Great Britain."1 16 Governance and financial structures "differ markedly" among
major nations. 1 17 German firms differ markedly from firms in Scandinavia, France or the Benelux countries. 1 18 In fact, differences between German and firms in other countries seem especially persistent. 1 9
107. Id. at 74.
108. Id. at 77.
109. Id. at 78.
110. Id. at 84.
111. Id. at 85 (citation omitted); see also id. at 134 ("MNCs still retain the bulk of
their innovative capabilities in their home markets, and technology that does flow overseas tends to stay within multinational networks").
112. Id. at 93.
113. Id. at 109.
114. Id. at 15.

115. Id.
116. Id. at 12.
117. Id. at 23.
118. See, e.g., id. at 13.

119. Convergence advocates seem to see what they want to see. They see in some
agitation for change in Germany and in the Daimler and Deutsche Bank mergers harb-
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Japanese firms operate in foreign wholesale rather than retail markets,
use intrafirm investment to a great extent, and display "a comparatively
low level of integration in local markets." 120 In turn, Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Singapore each reflects great and persistent differences one from
12 1
another in governance, finance, and other aspects of business.
The strongest determinant of these differences is national origin:
[S]triking differences in firm behavior persist. These differences correlate
most obviously with corporate nationality, not with sectoral characteristics
or investment maturity ....

Those differences ...

are systemic. Across

firms, sectors, and in the aggregate,
only one set of behavioral variations
122
shines through-national ones.
Continuing their conclusion, the authors of Myth remark that:
The evidence ...

suggests a logical chain that begins deep in the idiosyn-

cratic national histories behind durable domestic institutions and ideologies
and extends to firm-level structures of internal governance and long-tern
financing. Those structures, in turn, are then linked to continuing diversity
in patterns of corporate R&D operations in the complex connections
between corporate FDI and IFT [intrafirm trading] strategies ....
[T]he
basic linkage ...

[is that] [d]istinctive national institutions and ideologies

shape corporate structure and vitally important policy environments in
home markets. The external behavior
of firms continues to be marked by
123
their idiosyncratic foundations.
"The Myth of Globalization" tells us what is, namely that "national
roots remain a vital determinant" and that multinationals' "corporate cores
remain national in a meaningful sense."' 12 4 The next question is to ask is,
"Why is that so?"
ingers of German participation in global convergence in corporate governance. See, e.g.,
Coffee, supra note 7, at 664, 676-82; Cunningham, supra note 7, at 1169. Based upon
systematic evidence, the authors of Myth see a picture of persistent difference and resistance to change rooted in national origin. The German economy is characterized by
codetermination of the supervisory board of large firms, a large role played by universal
banks which vote fifty percent or more of the shares in all large German firms, and a
pattern of cross share holdings. The result is an absence of hostile takeovers, a comfortable safety net for managers in the event of serious managerial mistakes or unantici-

pated market shocks because of the availability of backup resources from the banks,
stable research and development budgets and wider fluctuations in earnings than would
be tolerated in other countries. DoREMus ar AL., supra note 103, at 33-42.
120. Id. at 116.
121. Stewart R. Clegg & S. Gordon Redding, Introduction to CAPITALISM IN CONTRASTING CULTUREs, supra note 86, at 14.
[I]t would be mistaken to regard these countries [Japan and the 'little dragons' of
Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore] as essentially similar in their
patterns of economic success. They have quite distinct foundations which are
sufficiently different as to counter any too easy reliance on a view of a single
'post-Confucian' way.

Id.
122. DomMus Er
123. Id.
124. Id. at 145.

AL.,

supra note 103, at 139.

2001

"Global" Convergence in Corporate Governance

Ill. Cultural Insensitivity: Lack of a Culture Fit for the Global
Convergence Model of Governance
A.

Cultural Traits Implicit in the United States Governance Model

Convergence advocates rely heavily, really exclusively, on the United States
model of corporate governance. That model, of course, is centered on a
board of directors the majority of whom are independent, that is, free of
significant financial or perhaps even social contacts with the corporation's
senior managers. 12 5 Indeed, a respectable school of thought is that all
directors save one or two should be independent, non-executive
12 6
directors.
In turn, that independent board has a new and more focused mission.
United States corporate law once provided that the "business and affairs of
the corporation should be managed by a board of directors." Later, intermediate and less imperative versions of that mandate provided that the
business and affairs could be managed by others "under the supervision"
of a board of directors. 127 Today, one authoritative source for United
States law provides that the senior executives are to manage the business
and affairs of the corporation. 128 In turn, the board's role is to select, monitor, evaluate, and, if necessary, remove, the senior executive officers,
129
including principally the chief executive officer or managing directors.
The United States model contemplates a significant role for highly
individualistic behavior. For example, if a director of a United States corporation disagrees with action taken she should clearly voice her objection.
United States law commonly provides that a director is presumed to consent to action taken unless her dissent is recorded in the minutes of the
meeting or filed in writing immediately thereafter. 130 The United States
scheme contemplates a significant role for shareholder litigation. Individual shareholders who are aggrieved by corporate managers' acts should
rise up, retain attorneys, and bring suit to hold those managers
accountable.' 3 '

125. E.g., supra note 52 and accompanying text.

126. SEC's Williams Callsfor Independent Boards, Warns of Federal Intervention Into
Government, SEc. REG. & LAw REP. No. 437, Jan. 25, 1978, at A22 (noting argument by
Chairman of U.S. SEC that all directors save one should be independent); BRANSON,
supra note 20, § 5.03 (concluding that Delaware Supreme Court opinions constitute a de
facto requirement of a high degree of director independence).
127. In 1974 the American Model Business Corporation Act shifted to language that
"[a]ll corporate powers shall be... managed under the direction off ] a board of directors .... " MoDn Bus. CORP. Acr § 35 (1975). See generally BRANSON, supra note 20,
§ 5.02.
128. See AMERICAN LAWV INsnurE, supra note 12, § 3.01.
129. Id. § 3.02.
130. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 8.24(d).
131. AMERICAN LAw INSnTUTE, supra note 12, Part VII, "Remedies" (seventeen sections
dealing with derivative actions by shareholders).
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B.

Lessons in Diversity: The United States Model in Other Cultures

1.

The People's Republic of China and the Overseas Chinese

For example, a scheme that places significant reliance on highly individualistic forms of behavior does not mesh well, or at all, with the Confucian
value system of the Chinese. The People's Republic of China is, of course,
the most populous nation on earth. Through the Chinese diaspora, an
additional 40 million Chinese have emigrated to other East Asian nations,
where as of 1990 their family enterprises added $200 billion to various
states' gross annual domestic products. 132 Overseas Chinese number over
40 million, 133 playing significant roles in the economies of Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, the Phillippines, Malaysia and Thailand. 134 These roles
far exceed their number in their adopted countries. In the Philippines, for
example, overseas Chinese control 47 percent of the 68 locally owned publicly held companies. 135 In 1990, Chinese accounted for 2.1 percent of the
13 6
population but 75 percent of the private domestic capital in Indonesia.
Although Confucianism lacks either a deity or an organized church,
13 7
Confucian values permeate the lives of Chinese peoples everywhere.
From a very early age, "[i]n the school context, Confucianism is taught by
the study of the main writings and the discussion of their implications.
The child is encouraged to memorize the classics and to build relationships
based on the Confucian principles." 13 8 Central to those relationships is a
13 9
high degree of abnegation of self and tolerance and patience for others.
One has to question how a corporate governance model that entails a certain degree of confrontation and a high degree of individualistic behavior
fits with beliefs that "an individual must fit into and conform with the
basic social order of his surrounding world."'140 That order is "strongly
132. S. GORDON REDDING,
133. Id. at 3, 18.

THE SPIRIT OF CHINESE CAPITALISM

3 (1990).

134. Id. at 2, 17.

135. Id. at 29.
136. Id. at 25.
137. There has been very little assimilation into the ambient culture by overseas Chinese. See, e.g., id. at 57 (noting little assimilation in Malaysia, the Philippines, or Indonesia). Other nations such as Japan and Korea are said to be influenced by "postConfucian" values. The post-Confucian thesis is attributed to HERMAN KAHN, WORLD
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 1979 AND BEYOND (1979). Kahn proposed "that the success of
organizations in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore was due in large part
to certain key traits shared by the majority of organization members which were attributable to an upbringing in the Confucian tradition." Stewart R. Clegg et al., 'Post-Confucianism" Social Democracy and Economic Culture, in CAPITALISM IN CONTRASTING
CULTURES, supra note 86, at 38.
138. REDDING, supra note 132, at 48.
139. "The Confucian ideal is that family, clan, and head of state take precedence over
the individual." Id. at 63. In a series of interviews with Chinese business men, a representative answer demonstrated the Chinese principle of tolerance: "[B]e tolerant-it creates less worries. Try to put the lawyers out of business." Id. at 87.
140. Id. at 58. In the Confucian context, "the individual has a built-in sense of the
legitimacy of the superior-subordinate relationship ...

it is an extension of a natural

order. The open challenge of formal authority is rare." Id. at 61.
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hierarchical" with each individual regarding himself "not only... as part
of nature but also part of the natural order..."
one of the most important effects of Confucianism, and one of the principal
determinants of social and economic behavior... is the passivity induced
by a system which places the individual in a powerfully maintained family
order, itself inside a powerfully maintained state order, itself seen as part of
a natural
cosmic order, and all dedicated to the maintenance of the status
1
quo. 14
Core values in economic behavior include a "concern for reconciliation, harmony [and] balance" coupled with "practicality as a central
focus." 14 2 It is doubtful whether individuals taught from an early age that

"the shiny nail is the first to feel the sting of the hammer" will confront and
forcibly remove underperforming CEOs or step forward to file derivative or
class action lawsuits. 143
144
2. The Republic of Indonesia
Other societies remain highly feudal in character. In Indonesia, the world's
third largest democracy and fourth most populous nation, for example, a
strong sense of permanence in the socioeconomic order, which after all
still has a network of ruling sultans, may prevent the development of the
cadre of independent directors and the required behavior by them or sufficiently aggressive shareholders to make United States style corporate governance take hold. The perception is widespread that it is futile to
145
challenge one who "has the power."
The quasi-feudal nature of Indonesian society is an impediment to
United States style corporate governance. In the 1998-99 Asian economic
crisis, 38 Indonesian banks, many of them publicly held, were closed, as a
result of extreme mismanagement that had permitted over $90 billion
United States in loan defaults. 146 Indonesian corporate law clearly provides for derivative actions by shareholders. 1 4 7 Yet not a single share-

141. Id. at 52.

142.

REDDING,

supra note 132, at 76.

143. In the United States model, by contrast, the 1990s witnessed an unprecedented
number of forced removals of CEOs of major United States corporations. See, e.g.,
DomMus Er AL., supra note 103, at 26 (noting the ouster of chief executive officers at,
inter alia, IBM, Kodak and Westinghouse).
144. In 1999-2000, the author was a USAID consultant to the Indonesian Ministry of
Justice on corporate law revision and corporate governance reform in Indonesia.
145. See, e.g., KEiTH LovEARD, SUHARTO: INDONEsIA's LAST SULTAN 123-24 (1999) ("for
the vast majority of Indonesians, and particularly the Javanese ....
there was a strong
sense that he had control of the power and that whatever they did to oppose it would be
futile"); see also Clegg & Redding, Introductionto CAPITALISM IN CONTRASNG CULTURES,
supra note 86, at 23 ("[Tlhe feudal nature of traditional Chinese social relationships has

in some important local respects survived intact into the present day: the 'var-lords'
have changed, but practices of the fief have remained remarkably constant.").
146. LovEARD, supra note 145, at 380.
147. New Company Law of Indonesia ("Undang-undang Tentang Perseroan
Terbatas"), Law Number 1 of the Year 1995, Articles 85 & 98 (authorizing suit against a
director or commissioner who "has caused losses to the Company due to his fault or
negligence.") [hereinafter Company Law of Indonesia].
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holder suit was filed. The absence of suit may be in part explained by the
weakness of the Indonesian legal system but cultural factors are also at
work in a situation which in the United States would have produced a
firestorm of litigation.
Another concept of Indonesian society and the legal system might be
inimical to introduction of United States style corporate governance. The
political and legal systems are founded on the notion of musyawarah and
mufakat, translated as "discussion and consensus." 148 The concept places
upon parties to a proceeding or transaction a duty to avoid confrontation,
including a duty even to avoid pushing issues to a formal vote. Duties
based upon "discussion and consensus" are reflected not only in the customary law of Indonesia but in the company law itself. For example, "[tihe
resolutions of the GMS [General Meeting of Shareholders] shall be adopted
based on the principle of deliberation to reach a consensus." 149
3.

The World's Dominant Form of Economic Organization- Family
Capitalism

A third example of the lack of cultural fit for the United States style corporate governance systems first requires a brief overview of the dominant
form of capitalism in many countries-family capitalism. For example,
overseas Chinese firms represent "molecular organization-heavily
networked family firms" that tend toward vertical integration.15 0 In South
Korea, the Chaebol are "family dominated, but less centralized, grow
extremely large, are elaborately and formally co-ordinated ... [t]heir environment is also patrimonial . . . [and] has a similarly Confucian moralbased government." 1 5 1 Indonesia has a brand of family capitalism characterized by "long term mutually enriching alliances between local military
15 2
forces and Chinese businessmen."
Turning toward Europe, France's government yearns for finance capitalism with the dispersed type of share ownership it produces. 153 The
truth is, however, that France's economic topography is populated by family firms, including family controlled publicly held firms. 15 4 The same
55
may be said of Italy.'
148. LovEAw, supra note 145, at 114.
149. Company Law of Indonesia, supra note 147, Article 74(1).
150. S. Gordon Redding & S. Tam, Networks and Molecular Organizations:An Exploratory View of Chinese Firms in Hong Kong, in K.C. MUN & T.S. CHAN, PERSPECTIVES IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 192-242 (1985).
151. S. Gordon Redding & Richard D. Whitley, Beyond Bureaucracy: Towards a ComparativeAnalysis of Forms of Economic Resource Co-ordinationand Control, in CAPITALISM
IN CONTRASTING CULTURES, supra note 86, at 101.
152. See generally RIcHARD ROBINSON, INDONESIA: THE RISE OP CAPITAL (1986); see also
LovEaDm, supra note 145, at 21, 33-35, 201.
153. Fanto, supra note 17, at 69-71.
154. Bloch & Kremp, supra note 23, at 18 ("Families seem to play an important role
in ownership and voting power, both in unlisted firms and in the CAC 40 firms.").
155. See Family Firms in Italy: The Generation Game, ECONOMIST, March 4, 2000, at

65.
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While in some families a willingness may exist to appoint independent
directors and permit them to constitute a majority of the board, as the
United States governance model dictates, in many other families there will
not be such a willingness to relinquish power. The same observations may
be made with regard to the rigorous evaluation and possible removal of
senior executive officers. The culture of family capitalism will pose an
obstacle to that occurring with any frequency.
The teaching of years of comparative study is that it is the culture
beneath the law and behind economic and other institutions that is as or
more important than law itself, legal structures, and good governance practices. "At the heart of the matter is the manner in which culture, as a process, tends, cultivates and regulates particular types of economic
outcomes."1 5 6 With the nearly complete absence of any discussion of varying cultures, or of the role of culture, the United States global convergence
advocates seem never to have learned those basic truths about comparative
study.
IV. Different Views of the Deus Ex Machina: Anglo-American
"Ascendent" Economics Versus "Embedded Capitalism"
A. Embedded Capitalism
United States academic elites, including the global convergence advocates,
seem to hold as universal a view of economies as free-standing machines
with profit maximization as each firm and the nation's goal, market forces
supreme, and the society subservient to, or at least apart from, the economy. That mind set, heavily imbued as it is with the supremacy of the
individual and laissez-faire, traces its roots to the writings of John Stuart
Mill, Adam Smith, Karl Marx and, later, Max Weber and Frederick Hayek,
who mistook the tendencies of 19th century English markets to be univerbased upon empirical observations of a very few westsal laws and did15so
7
ern economies.
Yet, outside of the former British Empire, and even to some extent
within it, the world's economies are perceived as serving the society as
whole. Citizens and national leaders see the economy as but an element of
the larger society. The view is that for most capitalistic countries the
proper form of capitalism is "embedded capitalism." 15 8
Certain welfare economists believe that the natural state of things is a
form of constrained, regulated capitalism rather than unfettered markets.
A constrained market economy is the inevitable result of the interplay of
capitalism and democracy. Through politics the majority (the "have nots")
156. Clegg et al., supra note 137, at 32.
157. JOHN GRAY, FALSE DAWN: THE DELUSIONS OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM 169-70 (1998).
158. This phenomenon is a testament to what Granovetter has termed the "embeddedness of economic actions": "the argument [is] that the behavior and institutions to be
analyzed [in economic analysis] are so constrained by ongoing social relations that to
construe them as independent is a grievous misunderstanding." Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problemof Embeddedness, 91 Am. J. Soc. 481,481-

82 (1985).
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will elect representatives based upon platforms and programs that promise
to temper or brake the Darwinian "survival of the fittest" that is the product of the unfettered market system and limit at least runaway economic
success by the most fortunate in the society (the "haves").' 5 9 In fact, relatively unfettered markets have existed only in two eras: Victorian times in
England and the Thatcher-Reagan years in the United States and the
U.K.1 60
B. The Individual Versus the Society
Stronger still, the market individualism of market leaning economies is
simply intolerable in many societies. The economy is embedded in the
social order and social cohesion, not rugged individualism, is the value in
the ascendancy. 16 1 For example, "[I]ife in a collectivist and group-dominated society means that the Chinese self is not isolated in the same sense
as the Western one."' 6 2 In some cultures, firms are "independent legal

163
entities which are well bounded and distinct from their environments."'
By contrast, theorists have recognized Asian business firms' "form and
operation as contingent, socially contextual phenomenon varying across
164
cultures and historical periods."'
Convergence advocates might point to the unparalleled economic success of the United States in the 1990s as predictor that United States style
corporate governance will vanquish any rivals. But United States economic
success, with its concomitant supremacy of the individual, is viewed in
much of the world as destructive of social cohesion and to be avoided
rather than emulated. 165 To observers and opinion makers in many countries, the United States's high divorce, murder, and incarceration rates, categories in which the United States leads the world, 166 together with the

159. KARL PoLANyi, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 119 (1944) (noting that Burke and
Bentham, among others, "refused to defer to zoological determinism ... [and] rejected
the ascendency [sic] of economics over politics proper").
160. GRAY, supra note 157, at 14-16 (noting that truly free market economy only
existed in Anglo-Saxon societies in mid Victorian England (1840-70)).
161. Id. at 26 ("In the normal course of things markets come embedded in social life.
They are circumscribed in their working by intermediary institutions [such as labor
unions and professional associations] and encumbered by social conventions and tacit
understandings."), 182 ("As in other economic cultures, Chinese capitalism comes
embedded in the networks and values of the larger society.").
162. REDDING, supra note 132, at 95; see also Thomas A. Acton, Ethnicity and Religion
in the Development of Family Capitalism:Seui-Seung-Yahn Immigrants from Hong Kong to
Scotland, in CAPITALISM IN CONTRASTING CuLTuREs, supra note 86, at 391 ("'Economy' and
'culture' have been seen by westerners as two great independent variables or value systems while Asian cultures see them as closely intertwined or one (economy) deeply
embedded in the other").
163. Redding & Whitley, supra note 151, at 80.
164. Id.; see also id. at 79 ("Anglo-Saxon conceptions of the legally bounded form as
the basic unit of economic action are inadequate to explain the economic actions and
structures of [Korean] claebol and Chinese family businesses").
165. GRAY, supra note 157, at 101, 115-16.
166. One of every 193 United States adults is incarcerated or under restraint. The
United States's rate of incarceration is four times that of Canada, five times that of the
U.K., and fourteen times that of Japan. GRAY, supra note 157, at 116; see also Graham
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obscene rates of United States corporate executive compensation, 16 7 symbolize the abandonment of social cohesion and the ascendancy of market
style individualism and unbridled greed. There is no trend to homogeneity
in world economics, as globalization advocates might assert. Modernization and Westernization are not converging trends, as the underlying premise of global convergence scholarship implies. For much of the world,
modernization and Westernization have become diverging trends or,
indeed, anathema to one another. 168 In the march of progress, many less
affluent nation states regard themselves as ahead of, not behind, the United
States.
In fact, in much of the world the belief is that, by emulating the United
States and copying its economic thoughts and institutions, a sort of
Gresham's Law 1 69 will prevail: bad capitalism (United States style) will
drive out good capitalism (family capitalism, bamboo capitalism, guided
1 7°
capitalism).
C. Impenetrable Barriers to Western Economic Ideas
In still another part of the world in a subset of nations powerful political
and religious forces cause the rejection of all Western ideology:
In China, Malaysia and Singapore, in Egypt, Algeria and Iran, in post-communist Russia and parts of the Balkans, in Turkey and India, the end of the

Cold War has released powerful political movements which reject all westernizing ideologies ....
Only in the United States is the Enlightenment project of a global civilization
still a living political faith. During the Cold War this Enlightenment faith
era it
was embodied in American anti-communism. In the post-communist
17 1
animates the American project of a universal free market.
Many of the Muslim nations of the world (Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia,
Indonesia to an extent) are loathe to permit American influence of any
kind to flourish within their borders. Some of that group actively block
penetration of United States economic or other ideas.
United States global convergence advocates have the wrong view of
capitalism and economies of the world. They have, it seems, fallen prey to

the error of John Stuart Mill or Adam Smith, who also made sweeping
(global) assertions based upon empirical observations of a few (a very
Searjeant, Economically,Jails Cost More Than CornerShops, THE TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 11,
1995, at 38 ("Why do we look to America for economic and social models, from deregulation and institutional investor power to workfare schemes, if they produce this kind of
society?").

167. In 1989, U.S. C.E.O.s earned 160 times the pay of the average worker, while in
Japan the figure was 16 and in Germany 21. GAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF ExcEss: THE
OVERCOMPENSAnON OF AMERICAN EXEcUTIVES 205-09 (1991). In 2000, compensation
consultant Graef Crystal says "it is 'north of 400 times and heading rapidly to 500
times."' Kathleen Day, Soldiers for the Shareholder, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2000, at HI.
168. GRAY, supra note 157, at 121.
169. Sir Thomas Gresham explained that "bad money drives out good." LaIsEY &
STEINER, supra note 98, at 592.
170. GAYv, supra note 157, at 78-79.
171. Id. at 101.
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few)1 72 western economies.
V.

Backlash Against American Economic Imperialism and
Globalization in Any Form as a Force Countering Any
"Global" Convergence in Corporate Governance

There are two principal types of backlash inimical to any "global" convergence of corporate governance, especially governance patterned on the
United States model. One form is a direct worldwide backlash against
United States influence and domination in everything from product markets to ideas. The other is the growing backlash against globalization, a
significant component of which is rooted in the notion that globalization is
little more than a vehicle for Americanization.
Scholars who posit a convergence in corporate governance proceed on
the premise that United States business, political and academic leaders can
project American products and values to the last corner of the earth. As the
following editorial from the InternationalHerald Tribune (Paris) suggests,
those leaders face significant backlash in creation of the new economy
empire they predict:
It is impossible to pinpoint the moment when the successes of the United
States in the 1990s moved from a topic of grudging admiration around the
world to a constant source of annoyance ... to a rationale of mistrust and
resistance.
Perhaps the clincher was envy over the dramatic ascent of the Dow Jones
industrial average from a little over 2,000 points at the start of the decade to
more than 11,000 this year. Maybe it was the dawning realization that people around the globe are all flicking on the same Windows operating system
in the morning, on their way to navigating an Internet dominated by U.S.
innovations and businesses ....
Maybe it was when the United States, in the wake of the Asian economic
crisis, began offering tutorials on American-style capitalism and insisting
that the financial architecture of the world be rebuilt to U.S. building
73
codes.1

It is not only protesters against the WTO in Seattle or at the IMF and
World Bank annual meetings in Washington, D.C., 1 74 but also a significant
172. See supra notes 66-78 and accompanying text (noting that convergence advocates
base their postulate of globalization on observations of the United States, on the one
hand, and the United Kingdom, Germany and France, with brief mention of outliers
from time to time).
173. David E. Sanger, U.S. Is the "800 pound Gorilla"- Global Power Encounters Envy
and Mistrust, INr'u HERALD TIB., July 19, 1999, at 1.
174. On disruption of the WTO meeting in Seattle, see for example Sam Howe
Verhovek & Steven Greenhouse, National Guard Is Called to Quell Trade-Talk Protests,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at Al; Timothy Egan, Black Masks Lead to Pointed Fingers in
Seattle, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 1999, at Al; Sam Howe Verhovek, Seattle Is Stung, Angry and
Chagrined as Opportunity Turns to Chaos, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 1999, at A16; Michael
Kazin, Saying No to WTO, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 5, 1999, at 17; Timothy Egan, Free Trade Takes
on Free Speech, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 5, 1999, at 1;John Burgess & Steven Pearlstein, Protests
Delay WTO Opening, WASH. PosT, Dec. 1, 1999, at 1; Tom Hayden et al., The Battle in
Seattle: What Was That All About, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1999, at BI. Disruption of the IMF
and World Bank annual meetings is chronicled in, inter alia,John Burgess, Activists Aim
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number of thoughtful persons around the globe who see globalization of
anything, including corporate governance, as a Trojan horse for United
States dominance:
One of the most frequent complaints about globalization is that it is
equivalent to Americanization. There are widespread fears that in today's
border-less, high tech world, national differences will be overwhelmed by
American economic and cultural domination ....175
First and foremost, according to its critics, globalization serves the
agenda of large United States based multinational corporations, for whom
growth of sales and profits are ascendant over all other values:
Growth, [critics of globalization] argue, can be wasteful, destructive, unjust.
The jobs created by globalization are often less sustaining and secure than
the livelihoods abolished by it. Weak economies abruptly integrated into the
global system do not become stronger, or develop a sustainable base; they
just become more dependent, more vulnerable
to the ructions of ultravola176
tile, deregulated international capital.
Globalization, to their way of thinking, is the imposition from above
by international institutions such as the WTO, IMF and World Bank, of a
worldwide Darwinian regime that will make the rich richer and the world's
poor no better off:
In many countries, the benefits of economic growth [wrought by globalization] are so unequally distributed that they intensify social and political tensions, leading to increased repression rather than to greater democracy. To
the hoary trope that a rising tide lifts all boats, critics
of corporate-led global177
ization retort that in this case it lifts only yachts.
It is easy to dismiss the concerns of protesters in Seattle, Washington,
Gothenberg, or Genoa as the poorly articulated, contradictory outcry of a
disorganized mob, and many do. 178 From their ivory tower perches in the
to Halt Meeting of World Bank and the IMF, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,Jan. 27, 2000, at 17; David
Sanger, Global Storm: Loan Agencies Under Siege, N.Y. TimEs, Apr. 16, 2000, at 1; John
Kifner & David E. Sanger, Financial Leaders Meet As Protests Clog Washington, N.Y.
TImEs, Apr. 17, 2000, at 1; John Burgess, Globalizationand Its Discontents,WASH. POST,
Apr. 13, 2000, at Al; Helene Cooper & Michael M. Phillips, Protests Hit World Bank/IMF
Sessions, WALL ST.J., Apr. 17, 2000, at A2.
175. Reginald Dale, 'Americanization'Has Its Limits, INT'L HERALD TRm.,Jan. 25, 2000,
at 9.
176. William Finnegan, After Seattle, Nev YORKER, Apr. 17, 2000, at 40, 42.
177. Id.; see also Michael M. Phillips, Can World Bank Lend Money to Third World
Without Hurting Poor?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2000, at Al (explaining that World Bank
finance of open pit coal mines in India has worsened rather than bettered the lives of

local citizens, and subsistence farmers have been displaced by expansion of mines).
178. E.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Senseless in Seattle, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at A23

(noting "a Noah's ark of flat-earth advocates, protectionist trade unions and yuppies
looking for their 1960's fix"); Global Whipping Boy: The Wrong-headed Take to the Streets
to Protest the WTO, PITTSBURGH Posr-GAzETrr, Dec. 5, 1999, at E2 (noting a "kaleidoscope of interests that feel victimized by changes in the way the world functions ...
[t]hey are on the wrong side of the issue, on the wrong side of history and on the wrong
side of the political tide ... [s]o, the losers took to the streets with a vengeance"); Stephen Schwartz, Seattle Has Gone 'Wobblie' Before, WALL ST.J., Dec. 3, 1999, at A14 ("[In]
'the 47 states and the Soviet of Washington' ... it should come as no surprise that the
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American academy, "global" convergence in corporate governance advocates do not even broach the subject of opposition to globalization, or any
other form of backlash. They simply believe that any ideas with which they
are associated, such as superior United States style corporate governance
practices and structures, ultimately will prevail in some world wide marketplace of ideas. 17 9 Backlash against United States influences and against
globalization cannot be quantified but they are palpable nonetheless. In
both forms, worldwide backlash poses a significant impediment to "global"
convergence in corporate governance.
VI. The Simple Irrelevancy of United States Style Corporate
Governance to the Pressing Problem of the New Century:
The Growth and Regulation of Large Multinational
Corporations
A. Background
The inexorable growth of large multinationals has been one of the least
noticed phenomena of the 1990s and, in the new century, is only now
receiving the critical attention it deserves. The growth of large multinational and truly international corporations poses a number of overlapping
problems, such as the irrelevancy-impotency of the nation state, the resulting field of play for economic imperialism, and resulting opportunities to
engage in regulatory arbitrage, leading to problems such as environmental
degradation and "plantation production," especially in the new industrializing countries (NICs) and less developed countries (LDCs) of the world.
Traditional corporate governance theory, structure, and practices deal with
solving problems thought to be generated by the separation of ownership
from control in large publicly held corporations. They are simply irrelevant to the problems posed by the growth of large, sprawling multinational
entities.
B. The Accelerating Growth of Large Multinationals
The number and size of large multinational corporations have grown at
geometric rather than arithmetical rates as of late. Predictions are that by
the year 2010 the number of large multinationals will be several times the
number that existed just a few years ago.' 8 0 Domestic and transnational
merger activity is at an all time high. Particularly in commodities areas
Seattle street fighters attempt to obstruct a WTO summit that aims to improve the eco-

nomic situation of the developing countries."); Francis Fukuyama, The Left Should Love
Globalization, WAL ST.J., Dec. 1, 1999, at A26 ("It is ironic that the left should rebel
against globalization, since globalization is one of the most progressive forces in the
world today.").
179. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
180. Eric W. Orts, The Futureof EnterpriseOrganization,96 MICH. L. REv. 1947, 1962
(1998) ("In the late twentieth century, the exponential growth of multinational or transnational corporate enterprise qualifies as one of the most important historical developments."). Looking to the past, multinationals accounted for 18% of the world's
manufacturing output and 7.5 % of total global output in 1992. Martin Wolf, The Heart

of the New World Economy, FIN.

TIMEs

(London), Oct. 1, 1997, at 16.
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(oil, aluminum), but also in automobile manufacture, telecommunications,
food and other fields, senior corporate managers are engaged in a quest to
be number one, two, or three in size-on a global rather than merely a
domestic or continental (EU or NAFTA) scale.
The quest to be in a handful of the largest corporations in a given field,
and on a global scale, is driving a headlong pursuit of size, manifesting
itself in a worldwide merger movement. The recent acquisition by Alcoa
Aluminum of Reynolds Metals Co. illustrates this trend.18 1 Alcoa faced a
situation in which three smaller foreign rivals combined to form an aluminum multinational with $21 billion in worldwide sales. 18 2 Alcoa's CEO
felt that Alcoa had no choice but to make a bear hug offer for the world's
third largest producer of aluminum products, Reynolds Metals. After the
acquisition, Alcoa will rival the world's largest producer, with slightly less
183
than $21 billion in annual sales.
In another commodities field, oil, Exxon has acquired Mobil Oil in a
$81.2 billion combination.18 4 The British Petroleum Amoco merger represents a $48 billion transaction, which has been followed by a proposed BP
Amoco PLC buyout of Atlantic Richfield Co. for $30 billion more.1 8 5 In the
summer of 1999, France's Fina Petroleum made an offer for Elf Acquitaine,
France's other large international oil company. Reminiscent of the Bendix
Martin Marietta "Pac Man" affair of the 1980s, Elf countered with a bid for
Fina. Later in the summer the two corporations agreed on a friendly amal86
gamation that will result in the world's fourth largest oil company.'
Global oligopoly seems a near certain prospect for the world's automobile manufacturing industry. Chrysler and Daimler-Benz have com181. See Robert Guy Matthews et al., Fitness Test: Alcoa-Reynolds Union Bears Stamps of
Deal Rocking Commodities, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 1999, at Al (noting the "latest in a
string of recent deals that have seen one commodity giant gobble up another" and
"mergers reflect the confluence of three important trends: industry consolidation, convergence of once-distinct lines of products or services, and globalization."); Matthew et
al., Commodity Crunch: Alcoa-Reynolds Deal Shows the Logic of Merger Dynamics-From
Aluminum to Oil, Survival of the Fittest is Now the Order of the Day, WALL ST.J. (Europe),
Aug. 20, 1999, at 1.
182. See Nikhil Deogun & Robert Guy Matthews, Reynolds Metals Yields to Alcoa's Bid,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 1999, at A3 (describing Alcoa's reaction to three way merger of
Canada's Alcan Aluminum, Ltd., France's Pechiney, SA and Switzerland's Alusuisse
Lonza Group.). But see Anita Raghavan & Nikhil Deogun, Alcan's Merger Plan May Be in
Jeopardy,WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2000, at A3 (noting antitrust opposition by Commission
of the European Union).
183. Deogun & Matthews, supra note 182.
184. Steve Liesman & Alexei Barrionuevo, Exxon and Mobil ShareholdersApprove the
$81.2 Billion Merger, WALL ST. J., May 28, 1999, at A4.
185. John R. Wilke & Steve Liesman, BP Amoco's Arco Buyout Faces Hurdles, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 2, 1999, at A2.
186. Thomas Kamm & Bhushan Bahree, French Oil Giants Agree to $48.7 Billion
Merger, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 1999, A15. Later, the Chevron acquisition of Texaco for
$38 billion relegated the combined French entity to fifth place worldwide. See, e.g.,
Neela Banerjee & Mary Williams Walsh, Texaco Hopes Chevron Can Polish Fading Star,
Irrr'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 18, 2000, at 15.
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bined' 8 7 as have Ford and Volvo. 188 In March 1999, Renault S.A. of France

took effective control of Nissan Motor Co. 18 9 General Motors Corporation
has held talks with Fiat SpA. 190 These latter business combinations
involve not only sheer size, but also portend an age of increasing transnational takeover and merger activity. 19 1
Carlo De Benedetti's 1988 attempt to take over Societe Generale de
Belgique was characterized as the first major transnational takeover, hostile
or friendly, in the European Union. 19 2 By that time, of course, the United
States had witnessed a crazy decade of merger activity, hostile takeovers,
insider trading scandals and financial excesses.
Europe and the EU member states are awakening, if not catching the
United States. In summer, 1999, Bank Nationale of France made two
simultaneous $38 billion hostile offers, for Paribas and for Belgium's
Societe Generale. 193 Deutsche Bank in Germany and Bankers Trust in the
United States have combined. 194 Recently, in telecommunications, Mannesmann A.G., the largest German wireless company, has acquired Orange
PLC, Britain's third largest wireless corporation, in a $33 billion transaction. 195 Vodafone Airtouch, PLC then made an offer for Mannesmann. 196

187. Keith Bradsher, Effective Today, Chrysler and Daimler-Benz Are One, N.Y. TiMES,
Nov. 12, 1998, at C4.
188. Edmund L. Andrews, Ford-Volvo: A DealforAll Sweden, N.Y. TImEs,Jan. 30, 1999,
at Cl.
189. Peter Landers, How Cable & Wireless Pulled Off an Upset in Japanese Takeover,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1999, at Al.
190. Deborah Ball, Fiatand GM Are Holding Talks About Alliance, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13,
2000, at A3; Keith Bradsher, New Terrain Drives Global Auto Industry to Merge, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Mar. 24, 2000, at 1.
191. The drug industry is another example of a sector headed toward oligopoly. See,
e.g., Stephen D. Moore et al.,
SmithKline and Glaxo Agree to Merger, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17,
2000, at A3 (noting that the $75.7 billion English-Swiss corporate combination will create the world's largest drug company); Robert Langreth, Pfizer, Warner-LambertAgree on
Terms, WALL ST.J., Feb. 7, 2000, at A3 (noting that the $84 billion transaction will create
the world's second largest drug company).
192. See William C. Symonds et al., De Benedetti's Grabfor a Big Piece of Belgium, Bus.
WK., Feb. 1, 1988, at 42. The De Benedetti bid may have helped hurry along the EU's
efforts on the transnational merger front. See generally Nathalie Basaldua, Towards the
Harmonization of EC-Member States' Regulations on Takeover Bids: The Proposalfor a
Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 487, 491 (1989)
("Certainly the best known example [of a takeover bid] in Europe is the hostile bid in
January 1988 for Societe Generale de Belgique... by the Italian entrepreneur, Carlo de
Benedetti").
193. See Advertisement, Bank National Popular (BNP), INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), July
26, 1999, at 7 ("Shareholders of Societe Generale and Paribas-Only 5 Days Left to Maximize Your Investment-Tender Your Shares to BNP."); Thomas Kamm & Deborah Ball,
Bank Merger Speculation Grows- Europeans Expect Cross Boarder Deals, WALL ST. J.
(Europe), Aug. 17, 1999, at 1.
194. Christopher Rhoads, Deutshe Bank's Bet Looks to Be Paying Off: In Buying Bankers
Trust, German Lender Boosts Investment-Bank Profit, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1999, at A16.
195. William Boston & Anita Raghavan, Mannesmann Agrees to Buy UK. 's OrangeFor
Cash, Stock, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1999, at A15.
196. Gautam Naik & Anita Raghavan, Vodafone to Sweeten Mannesmann Offer, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 17, 1999, at A3.
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The size of the acquisitions has become truly staggering. In the 1980's
the RJR Nabisco transaction featured in Barbariansat the Gate was thought
to have set a record for the size of the deal, a record that would endure, at
$24 billion. 19 7 The recent MCI World Wide Communications proposed
acquisition of Sprint is a $115 billion transaction. 198 The America Online
(AOL) Time Warner combination is a $165 billion transaction. 199 The
20 0
Vodafone offer for Mannesmann, A.G. is valued at $180 billion.
C.

An Illustrative New Multinational

A recent business combination of two multinationals frames the issues
nicely. Unilever, a Netherlands based food and consumer products company, is a mid-size multinational which has 138 subsidiaries in 71 countries worldwide: 11 in North America, 15 in the Latin America, 23 in Africa
and the Middle East, 23 on the Pacific Rim, 55 in the European Economic
Union, and 11 in the remainder of Europe. 20 1 Its worldwide sales are
approximately $44 billion.20 2 It employs 2.25 million people of whom
20 3
550,000 work on corporate owned plantations.
In May 2000, Unilever made overtures to a smaller United States based
food multinational, Best Foods Co. With $10 billion or so in worldwide
sales, Best has 62 subsidiaries operating in 110 different countries, many
on the Pacific Rim. 2 0 4 Combined, after the $20.3 billion acquisition, with
elimination of some overlap, the two multinationals will have over 200 subsidiaries in over 120 countries, with Best Foods' strong presence in Asia
complementing nicely Unilever's presence in the Americas and the European Union. The combined entity is now the world's second largest food
company, after Nestle of Switzerland, with Kraft Foods of the United States
20 5
ranking third.
A corporate organization such as the combined Unilever-Best organization illustrates nicely four interrelated regulatory problems: (1) power, size
and the resulting irrelevancy-impotency of the nation state; (2) increased
economic imperialism; (3) regulatory arbitrage; and (4) the related "plantation production" problem.
197. BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BnARLmANs AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR

NAmisco 480 (1990).
198. Rebecca Blumenstein, MCI Says Sprint Unit's Losses May Weigh on Firm, WALL
ST.J., Nov. 9, 1999, at B9.
199. See Saul Hansell, America Online Agrees to Buy Time Warner for $165 Billion;
Media Deal Is Richest Merger, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 11, 2000, at Al.
200. Philip Shishkin & William Boston, Vodafone Wins EU Clearanceto Acquire Mannesmann in Record $180 Billion Deal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2000, at A14.
201. UnileverAnnual Accounts 1999 at 41-43 (2000) (noting Principal Group Companies and Fixed Investments as of December 31, 1999).
202. Unilever Charts 1989-98 at 2 (2000).
203. Id. at 10.
204. Joyce Gannon, Bestfoods: A Big Company You Never Heard Of, PITrSBURGH PosTGAzErrE, Sept. 16, 1999, at All.
205. Shelly Branch, Mammoth Deals Are Expected to Spur More Consolidation in the
Food Industry, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2000, at A3.
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D.

The Regulatory Setting in the Multinational Corporate Sphere

1.

The Power and Size of Multinationalsand the Irrelevancy of the Nation
State

In the 1990s the case for regulation clearly departs from the 50 plus year
search by law professors and reformers to fill the vacuum created by the
separation of ownership from control Berle and Means hypothesized in
1932.206 Berle's and Means's analysis implicitly assumes a large but not all
powerful corporation operating, by and large, subject to the dictates of a
single nation state which, in theory, possesses sufficient power to regulate
should it desire to do so. Later reforms of the corporate social responsibility movement, such as federal chartering of corporations 20 7 or federal minimum standards, 20 8 hypothesized a lack of a will to regulate brought on by
charter mongering, the "race to the bottom" engaged in by the states. 20 9
Those proposals still assumed, however, the power of the nation state, in
the form of the federal government, to bend corporations to its will if it
wished to do so.
Today, however, large corporate empires sprawl across the globe. The
power of the corporation may not only exceed that of any host but also that
of the incorporating state. With a combined $54 billion in sales, the
Unilever-Best entity has an annual turnover that exceeds the gross domestic product (GDP) of all but about 50 nations, including Ecuador, the
United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Kenya, ranking just behind the Republic
of Ireland whose GDP is $59.9 billion. 2 10 Often the nation states in which
subsidiaries operate and in which externalities are most felt do not have
the power (or the will) to regulate. 2 11 This scenario brings renewed call for
2 12
the domiciliary state of the parent corporation to assert itself.
206. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDNIER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1991); ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING
CORORATE LAW 83, 90 (1999).
207. NADER ET A ., supra note 4, at 26-70; Schwartz, supra note 4; Note, supra note 4.

208. The leading piece was by the late Professor William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE LJ. 663, 666 (positing a "race to the
bottom" in states' competition for incorporations).
209. The opposing view was that competition for charters produced an efficient mix
of legal rules, resulting in a "race to the top" rather than "a race to the bottom." Barry D.
Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Racefor the Bottom v. Climb to the Top: The ALI Project and

Uniformity in CorporateLaw, 10J. CORP. L. 431,433 (1985); Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race
to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation
Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913, 920-22 (1982).
210. See, e.g., CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FAcTBOOK 1999, at http://

cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/gdp.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2001).
211. Eric W. Orts, The Legitimacy of Multinational Corporations,in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 258-60 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (noting that "multinational corporations often seem like ghosts escaping the various national and international laws that

reach out impotently to claim them" and "[sipread out among various countries, the
operations of multinational corporations are often above the law of any particular country."); see also KENICHI OHmAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE: THE RIsE OF REGIONAL
ECONOMIEs 39 (1995).

212. In response to which are heard replies that even domiciliary states lack the
power or the will to regulate. ROBERT B.

REICH,

THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OUR-
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In turn, incorporating nation states may refuse to take adequate action
because of the fear that large multinationals may reincorporate elsewhere.
Indeed, a multinational could move to an offshore incorporating jurisdiction (the Netherlands Antilles, the Cook Islands, Grand Cayman) in which
2 13
secrecy prevails and the threat of meaningful regulation is nil.

Observations as to sheer power and size have led many scholars to
predict or proclaim the irrelevancy of corporate law and of the identity of
the incorporating state.2 14
2.

Economic Imperialism

On quaint Fort Street, in Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, a United
States Banana Republic Store and a Burger King have displaced a Scots
Tartan store and a tea shop that had been on Fort Street for decades. The
main street of a middle size town in Malaysia will be lined with United
States franchised fast food outlets: a Kentucky Fried Chicken, an A & W
Root Beer and a Burger King. Can a GAP store be far behind? The United
States based McDonalds is everywhere, its stores and its billboards despoiling the urban and the rural landscapes of countries around the globe.
In their attempts to homogenize the world, United States multinationals often attempt to march in under the banner of free trade. Monsanto has
attempted to shoehorn its genetically engineered seed products into the
European Union, over the objections of French farmers. 2 15 Prodded by
multinational United States based producers, the United States trade representative argues for the introduction into European markets of beef fat21ST CENTURY CAPITALISM 136-53 (1991) (positing "[tihe coming irrelevancy
of corporate nationality"); Orts, supra note 211, at 253 (citation omitted).
Even when the international context is explicitly considered [by American legal
academics in their writings] ... discussion often degenerates into a neomercantilist debate over comparative models of corporate law. This debate is neomercantilist because it advances the assumption that multinational corporations
will necessarily act as faithful instruments of the nation-states in which their
parents are incorporated, rather than recognizing the more complex reality that
multinationals are in fact becoming more and more "stateless."
SELVES FOR

Id.
213. A vexing conundrum has been precisely why so few, if any multinationals have
moved to an offshore incorporating state. Scholars have raised the possibility of a "bandit" multinational moving off shore but it seems not to have occurred. ERIC HOBSBAWM,
THE AGE OF ExTREMES: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD 1914-1991, at 278 (1996) ("[a] suitably
complex and ingenious combination of the legal loopholes in the corporate and labour
laws of kindly mini-territories-for instance, Curacao, the Virgin Islands and Liechtenstein-could do wonders for a firm's balance-sheet").
214. See supra note 30; see also Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, A Public

Choice Model of InternationalEconomic Cooperationand the Decline of the Nation State, 18
CARmozo L. REV. 925 (1996).

215. Sam Lowenberg, For American Businesses Lobbying the European Union Has
Become a Priority,Am. LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 8, 1999, at 1 (noting that Monsanto hired
former U.S. Trade Representative to lobby EU and to overcome French opposition to
genetically engineered seed products); Bill Lambrecht, World Recoils at Monsanto's Brave
New Crops, ST. Louis PosT-DIsPATCH, Dec. 27, 1998, at Al; Sam Loewenberg, Cultivating
Allies in Genetic Food Fight, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 13, 1999, at 14.
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tened using human growth hormones.2 16
This is the new economic imperialism. That imperialism views the
eradication of all barriers as tantamount to globalization. That imperialism wants a world without borders so that the same products and services
dominate market after market. That imperialism uses globalization as a
bulldozer to crush resistance to achievement of those goals by the multinational corporations that are the progenitors of economic imperialism.
3. Regulatory Arbitrage by Multinationals
The need to regulate, based upon the global scenario, is buttressed by a
refinement, the notion of "regulatory arbitrage. '2 17 A multinational may
locate activities in nation states in which the regulation poses the least, or
no, obstacle to the activity in which the multinational wishes to engage.
For example, the multinational may locate a polluting facility in a former
Soviet Republic in which environmental law or enforcement is not only lax
but non-existent. The same multinational might locate a "knockoff" manufacturing facility in a nation with a large market for the product and little
or no protection for intellectual property, such as the People's Republic of
China. With labor intensive manufacturing the multinational may seek out
a developing nation eager for employment at any cost and locate a facility
there. Through time, the multinational may shift activities from country to
country, depending upon the regulatory obstacles that spring up in the
multinational's path, usually as the standard of living and expectations
18
rise. 2
A combined Unilever-Best, with 200 separate operations already existent in 120 countries around the globe, and on every continent save Antarctica, illustrates the potential for regulatory arbitrage open to managers of a
far flung multinational.
4. The PlantationProductionProblem
Multinationals may move activities to host nations in which working conditions are substandard to atrocious and in which wages paid do not rise
even to the level of a living wage. Over decades a manufacturer might move
216. In retaliation, the United States put punitive tariffs on Roquefort cheese, French
mustard, and other luxury foods, sparking destruction of a McDonald's in France and
elevation of the French farmer who led the raid to the status of anti-globalization folk
hero. Suzanne Daley, French Turn Vandal into Hero Against U.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2000,
at Al; Suzanne Daley, French See a Hero in War on 'McDomination,' N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
1999, at Al.
217. See Orts, supra note 211, at 250 ("Multinational flexibility allows firms to perform regulatory arbitrage,that is, to shift operations among countries to take advantage
of differing legal requirements, for example, lower labor costs due to absence of minimum wage laws or unions, more flexible antitrust or tax law, or weaker environmental
law.") (emphasis in original) (citingJoel P. Trachtman, InternationalRegulatory Competition, Externalization, and Jurisdiction,34 HILv.Irr'L LJ. 47 (1993)).
218. Nike is an example a multinational that has engaged in regulatory arbitrage over
time. As wages and expectations rise and requirements for better working conditions
are adopted by host nations, Nike has moved its athletic shoe manufacturing facilitiesfrom Korea to Thailand, then to Indonesia, and, currently, to Vietnam.
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a facility from Korea to Malaysia to Indonesia to Vietnam. Newly industrializing countries (NICs) of Africa could be next in the parade of host
states. In other instances, a manufacturer may move manufacture or
assembly activities from facility to facility in the same country, as in the
that has occurred in Mexico and has accelerated
maquiladoraphenomenon
2 19
under NAFTA.
Host states often welcome roving multinationals, despite the exploitation of their citizens involved. In competition for economic growth, other
states that may be prone to regulate at least more extreme forms of worker
exploitation do not do so, fearing a competitive disadvantage. Among
nation states a collective action problem exists that may be solved by international organizations such as the World Bank or the World Trade Organization. Within the WTO, however, the NICs and the LDCs resist,
perceiving WTO efforts to regulate plantation production as a ploy by
wealthier states to keep NICs and LDCs in their place. 2 20 Given the economic disparities among nations around the globe, the plantation production problem seems an intractable one, 2 21 certainly not susceptible to
traditional corporate governance analysis.
E. The Irrelevance of Traditional Corporate Governance to the
Multinational Sphere
In 1932 Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means published their empirical findings with regard to the publicly held corporation. 2 22 Berle and Means
found that with modern communications, well-organized stock exchanges
and a proliferation of investors the owners of incorporated business had
become dispersed and their shareholdings had become, for the most part,
atomized. The modern corporation represented a new form of property.
Those who owned the property, the shareholders, no longer controlled it.
Instead, self-perpetuating boards of directors and senior corporate manag219. Maquiladoras assemble motor vehicle parts, electric capacitors, stuffed animal
toys, apparel, televisions sets, electric motors, and a host of other products, often for
multinationals, using low cost labor in tilt up construction facilities that may change
products on a sixty or ninety-day basis. See generally, Khosrow FATEMI, THE MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY: ECONOMIC SOLUTION OR PROBLEM? (1990); KATHRYN KOPINAK, DESERT
CAPITALISM: MAQUILADORAS IN NORTH AMERICA'S WESTERN INDUSTRIAL CORRIDOR (1996);
LESLIE SKLAIR, ASSEMBLING FOR DEVELOPMENT: THE MAQUILA INDUSTRY IN MEXICO AND THE
UNITED STATES (1989).

220. CompareJonathan Peterson, Leadership Struggle Reflects Growing Schism in WTO
Trade, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 1999, at C1, with Tyrone Beason, WTO in Seattle: Herman Bids
to Put Labor on Agenda- Clinton Administration Official Promotes Worker Rights, SEATTLE
TIMES, Oct. 26, 1999, at El.

221. In addition to the potential for oppression of less developed countries, law making in the international context brings another set of problems. The bureaucrats, trade
representatives, and others who make law in the international sphere lack accountability
to any electorate. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text. See generally Stephan,
Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, supra note 93, at 681. Critics "assert that the establishment
of NAFTA and the World Trade Organization (WTO) will mean that state and federal
legislatures no longer may decide what kind of environmental safeguards or standards
of consumer and worker protection we will have." Id. at 681.
222. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 206.
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ers controlled the property. Berle and Means hypothesized and then
proved the existence of the fabled "separation of ownership from
22 3
control."
Due to what we today call collective action problems, even when shareholders detect that corporate managers are underperforming, or performing in other undesirable ways, shareholders find it very difficult to unite
and then reassert themselves. Collective action problems include the difficulty in many public corporations of identifying who fellow shareholders
are in the first place and then the costs of communicating with them. The
latter costs include regulatory costs, most specifically the cost of complying with the SEC's rules governing proxy solicitation, which permit the
corporation and its managers to sue the activist shareholder for mere slips
of the pen in their communication with others. Another collective action
problem is the "free rider" problem. A certain number of fellow shareholders may support the activists in spirit, but not financially, or in other meaningful ways. They will watch closely, but only as bystanders who "free
ride" on the efforts of their activist brethren.
Traditional corporate governance analysis deals with what regulatory
or market forces should fill the "vacuum" created by the separation of ownership from control. Most "reforms" propose insertion of substitute
monitors, who will supply the monitoring the dispersed shareholder no
longer can provide. Substitute monitors include governmental (Ralph
Nader's proposed Federal Chartering Agency), reinvigorated shareholders
(expanded SEC shareholder proxy proposal rule), auditors and enhanced
audits (corporate social accounting), public interest directors, or activist
institutional investors.
Another approach is to use those and other devices such as performance based compensation to re-align managers' interests with shareholders's interests. Economists would posit that any agent, whether it be the
property manager for an absentee landlord or the senior executive of a
major corporation with dispersed shareholders, has a different agenda than
does the owner and will not take care of the property in the same manner
as the owner would if she were present. Thus agents may engage in shirking (laziness, playing excessive amounts of golf) or opportunistic (self serving, self dealing) behavior. The central problem of corporate law, and
2 24
especially corporate governance, is to reduce these agency costs.

The current vogue in United States style corporate governance emphasizes use of boards of directors comprised of truly independent directors. 2 25 Instead of managing the corporation's business and affairs, those

independent directors have a changed mission. Their focus should be to
223. Id. at 112-116.
224. The seminal piece is Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); see also Eugene F.
Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88J. PoL. EcON. 288 (1980).
225. See AMERiCAN LAw INSTITUTE, supra note 12, § 3A.01 ("The board of every large
publicly held corporation should have a majority of directors who are free of any significant relationship with the corporation's senior executives . . ").
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hire, evaluate, and, if necessary, replace the corporation's senior executive
officers. 22 6 Independent directors, assisted by a committee structure
(audit, nominating and compensation committees), 2 27 reduce agency costs
and represent the substitute monitor yearned for since Berle and Means
published their book.
In the multinational sphere, however, the evils imagined result from
managers over performing, relentlessly pursuing profit through economic
imperialism, excessive regulatory arbitration, degradation of the environment and plantation production. The United States style corporate governance model, which convergence advocates say should or already does
dominate on global fronts, contemplates an underperforming or self dealing manager, not an over performing one. Put another way, in the international sphere, the senior managers and dispersed owners share an interest
in financial returns that is less hampered, or not hampered at all, by an
agency cost problem. Their interests are in alignment rather than out of
alignment, as traditional corporate governance theory hypothesizes. Why
this is so is a matter for conjecture. Perhaps it is because of the larger
stakes and the absence of significant obstacles, the "easy pickings" as it
were in the multinational sphere.
Professor Lawrence Cunningham labels what traditional United States
style corporate governance analysis and debate deals with as "vertical" corporate governance. 2 28 Assessments are made along a vertical line running
up from shareholders through boards of directors and other monitors
(such as auditors) to senior executive managers. The alignment, or lack of
alignment, of various groups' interests along that vertical line is a central
subject for discussion.
The large multinational corporation poses a completely different set of
potential problems. Economic imperialism, degradation of the environment, regulatory arbitrage, and plantation production are problems of
"external" corporate governance. 2 29 How a large multinational corporation interacts with the multitudinous societies and nation states in its far
flung empire is a subject on which corporate governance, of the type the
United States global convergence advocates know and write about, has verylittle if anything to say.
The self-anointed corporate governance experts, elite as they may be in
the United States corporate law academy, are not cognizant of the real
issues of the twenty first century. Their advocacy of "global" convergence,
and that along the lines of United States style corporate governance, is not
based upon "global" developments, is culturally chauvinistic, and is anach226. See id. § 3.02(a)(1) ("The board of directors of a publicly held corporation
should perform the following functions: (1) Select, regularly evaluate, fix the compensa-

tion of, and, where appropriate, replace the principal senior executives ....
227. See id. §§ 3A.03, .04, .05.
228. Cunningham, supra note 7, at 1134 ("Internal governance mechanisms are classified as vertical when they address the relationship between those in control of the
corporation and all other constituents (including shareholders, workers, lenders...
229. Id. ("external corporate governance" defined).
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ronistic. With the looming menace of gargantuan multinationals roaming
the earth, events have moved swiftly past the elites' "global" convergence
advocacy. As described above, in the larger scheme of things, "global" convergence in corporate governance is simply beside the point.
Conclusion
Convergence in corporate governance may occur in discrete areas, such as
financial accounting or disclosure standards. That convergence is far more
likely to be regional rather than "global." In East Asia, for example, the ten
SEAN states, perhaps lead by Singapore, could encourage direct foreign
investment in the region, although at present there is no evidence of such a
development beginning, let alone occurring.
Seldom will one see scholarship and advocacy that is as culturally and
economically insensitive, and condescending, as is the "global" convergence advocacy scholarship that the elites in United States academy have
been throwing over the transom. Those elites have oversold an idea that
has little grounding in true "global" reality.
Instead those academics should turn their not inconsiderable talents
to the issues of the new century. The astounding growth of huge multinational corporations, the impotence or lack of will among nation states to
regulate them, the role of international organizations in the regulation of
multinationals, and the relevance or lack of relevance of traditional corporate governance regimes-not "global" convergence in corporate governance-are the corporate law issues to which we must devote our time and
our thoughts in the twenty first century.

